Morocco’s managed liberalization

The recent issue of the Journal of Democracy features several articles that examine the September 2007 elections to Morocco’s House of Representatives. The right-of-center Istiqlal Party won the most votes, ahead of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development that many expected to win. The elections were free and fair, as attested to by international observers. But they fell short of being a genuine expression of democratic governance.

Morocco has been hailed as one of the most reformist countries of the region, improving media freedom and human rights. But at the same time reforms so far have not addressed a fundamental imbalance in the distribution of power. The executive continues to dominate both politics and the economy. The king remains an absolute monarch. He names the premier and key ministers; initiates all major legislation; appoints provincial governors and loyal judges; and owns the two largest television networks.

In contrast, the powers of the House of Representatives, the only democratically elected institution, are very limited. In fact, its members do not have much to do and therefore have little incentive to feel invested in what they do or to start reforming their parties to better reflect the needs and concerns of their constituents.

Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes conclude that

The monarchy seems to want genuine democracy for a day – election day, when the world is watching – and managed democracy for all the other days of the year. The voters declined to play along with the charade, and made their dissatisfaction clear.

Indeed, Moroccan votes communicated their discontent: only 37 percent of registered voters cast ballots, and about one-fifth of those ballots were purposefully spoiled as a sign of protest. Mohamed Tozy adds:

The 2007 elections were not about putting competing political projects or social options before the voters in order to let them choose among them. (…) The elections will not, for instance, affect core economic policies [that] have already been made and were not discussed, much less criticized, during the campaign period. (…) In a democracy, determining the composition of the parliament is enough to determine the character of the government. In Morocco, however, the palace quickly intervened to impose its own team, forcing party leaders to accept technocrats who are already familiar with public matters.

McFaul and Cofman Wittes also point out that in the face of citizen’s dissatisfaction with his strategy of “managed” liberalization, the king now has two options going forward:

If democratic forms lose legitimacy, then tightly managed liberalization, far from ensuring stability in a dangerous environment, may end up pushing Moroccans away from peaceful politics and toward extremists. (…) A second option is to take further steps toward democracy. To re-engage voters, the king would have to strengthen Parliament and the mainstream parties, reducing his own power in the process.

The case of Morocco shows that democratic governance is about much more than elections – even free and fair. As long as the concentration of power remains in place and voters have no real input into policymaking, the Moroccan experiment with circumscribed liberalization will neither help the king nor satisfy the citizenry.