In order to challenge authoritarianism and advance democratic movements in the Middle East, the international community, including policymakers, civil society organizations and the media, should not underestimate the complexities of authoritarian political systems in the Arab world, nor overestimate the power of protest movements and popular discontent.
A recent spate of overzealous commentary by many political analysts, foreign leaders and the media has perhaps misguided the public about the vulnerability of Arab dictatorships, citing cracks within these political systems and forecasting a new era of political openness. For example, the Economist’s latest special report on the Arab world, “Waking from its Sleep” regards the Arab world to be ever more unstable, as their leaders are increasingly unable to cope with a litany of domestic troubles.
Unfortunately this analysis, like others, has somewhat over simplified authoritarian regimes, leading many to believe Arab dictators rely only on coercion, co-optation and sham elections to survive. Such a reasoning is an example of how easy it is to misjudge political systems in the Arab world. Reformers should better understand the nature of Arab authoritarianism and the local economic, political and social context which shapes and sustains it – and in order to do that, one must look beyond the surface.
Although instruments, such as coercion and co-optation, have certainly helped Arab dictators maintain political hegemony and social dominance, political systems based on fear and patronage have proved to be very unstable. Such methods fail to explain the perseverance of Arab authoritarianism and how these regimes have acquired the ability to adapt to various crises and survive through the many turbulent political, economic and social changes of the past few decades.
One reason for the perseverance of Arab authoritarianism can be its distinctive elastic character. Arab dictators have had at their disposal a wide array of formal and informal linkages. These linkages determine the mode of formal and informal relationships between governmental institutions and organized interest groups and parties. The high degree of fluidity between these groups have enabled Arab regimes to be extremely adaptive to various internal and external pressures and respond to challenges quickly and efficiently so not to confront political reform.
Steven Heydemann, Director of Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University, has repeatedly described these linkages throughout his work. He believes such linkages enable governments to not only control formal institutions such as courts, parliaments, trade unions, and nongovernmental organizations for conflict resolution, bargaining and coalition management, but also modes of informal governance, which permit rulers selectively to operate outside formal institutional arenas. This allows them to make side payments, to bypass formal commitments, and to manage access to informal economic and political networks as a way to reward supporters and sanction opponents.
Ultimately, there is no single explanation which clarifies why authoritarianism has been resilient in the Arab world. However, the above example shows that there are an array factors to explore and in order to properly assess Arab political systems, strengthen democracy in the Middle East and support local civil society organizations and political movements, such factors need to be thoroughly investigated and debated openly. Coercion and co-optation are easy, single explanations that do not encompass all the complexities of Arab dictatorships.
Published Date: August 03, 2009