In 2018, widespread protests dislodged a decades-long kleptocratic regime in Armenia. Known as the Velvet Revolution, these protests represented a culmination of decades of civil society organization and activism and the first surge of revolutionary action against Serzh Sargsyan following his attempt to cling to power.
In this episode of Collectively Combating Kleptocracy, Gayane Abrahamyan, an award-winning journalist and social justice activist, who served as a member of the Armenian Parliament as part of the My Step alliance, joins the host, Max Levites (Senior Governance Specialist, International Republican Institute), to discuss the key foundations and mechanisms that fostered a unity between civil society and citizens, leading to the Velvet Revolution. Abrahamyan shares her unique perspective on the trajectory of this unity and the involvement of marginalized groups while also outlining the importance of Armenia’s new-found democratic narrative as an outcome of the Velvet Revolution, among other short-term but key successes.
Subscribe to the podcast on Apple Podcasts or your Android device.
Transcript
Announcer (00:03):
Welcome to the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy Podcast series. This podcast is supported through a project on identifying successful collective action approaches against kleptocracy, as part of the United States Agency for International Development funded Democratic Elections and Political Processes’ cooperative agreement, carried out by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening. It is co-implemented by the International Republican Institute and the Center for International Private Enterprise, and accompanied by related case studies. The views expressed in this podcast are that of the speakers, and do not necessarily reflect the views of US Aid or the United States Government.
Max Levites (00:41):
Hello, and welcome to another episode in this series of podcast on Collection Action Against Kleptocracy. My name is Max Levites, and I am a senior governance specialist at the International Republican Institute. In this episode, we’ll be discussing Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. With me today us Gayane Abrahamyan, who is an award-winning journalist with over 25 years of experience covering human rights, corruption, gender equality, education, social justice, and the environment. She also served as a member of the Armenian Parliament, representing the My Step Alliance. She is currently the head of the For Equal Rights Education Center and the Article 3 Human Rights Club.
(01:14):
Welcome, Gayane. Thanks for being here.
Gayane Abrahamyan (01:15):
Hi. Thank you for having me.
Max Levites (01:18):
Can you start off by providing a little bit of background on what set off the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, and maybe why it inspired such a massive response from the public?
Gayane Abrahamyan (01:26):
Of course. Actually, in Armenia, for decades, there have been hundreds of movements, campaigns, political strikes, and rallies against kleptocracy, as for a long time there was already an understanding that the deep-rooted systemic corruption is destroying the country. Violating human rights, and actually killing all the aspirations for a democratic future within the society. But those have not reached success, other than raising the issue actually. I have to stress that the most important value of the decades of active struggles of civil society was to generate an understanding within the society that they are the ones who can change. That they have to become the actors and factors for change.
(02:25):
For this main agenda, as we as a civil society, we’re mainly focused on efforts on empowering and educating society with knowledge, tools, and means to fight for their rights. Being aware of their rights. This was that push them for struggle. Actually, at that moment they become the main actors during the 2018 revolutionary processes. They went to the street, and through the revolution, fought and changed the oligarchy regime.
(02:59):
In this term, generally public awareness was extremely important because for decades, the media landscape in Armenia was very, very problematic. Especially broadcasting TV companies were totally under control by authorities mainly, and there were only four or five online media outlets that we can say they were independent. They carried out investigations on corruption cases, revealing authorities’ and officials’ corruption ties and oligarchic methods, and their human rights violations. This was really important to generate within the public, because it cannot be done in one day, of course. You have to prepare the public for revolutionary processes.
(03:50):
I personally was also part of the struggle, as a journalist for 25 plus year. Mainly raising all these human rights violations and corruption issues. But also, in some period I understand that only rising the issue is not enough. We need, if there is now state institutional structures, so we have to build civil society. That’s why, in 2016, I founded non-governmental, nonprofit organization for equal rights. Also, I founded first and yet the only human rights club in Armenia, Article 3 Club. The name refers to Armenian Constitution article, which includes the basic principles of protection of human rights, et cetera. Actually, Article 3 Club became the main hub for activists, for students, especially for civil society during the revolutionary processes.
Max Levites (04:48):
During the revolution, obviously Nikol Pashinian was a big figure in it. But who were some of the other actors involved in mobilizing citizens?
Gayane Abrahamyan (04:58):
Actually, in parlor with the political processes. Nikol Pashinian was the head of the political campaign. There was another process which was organized by civil societies. Actually, I was part of that process. Also, youth campaigns. Different campaigns, both political, and activists, and civil society were joined. Different processes actually made their efforts jointly. This was the main reason that the success was there.
(05:32):
Our organization, for example, we run campaigns actually for many years, for decades already. But during that period, we run lots of campaigns trying also to make people understand that all the fake narratives, fake news are there because, back then and also now, the former authorities were waging a serious informational war of narratives against us, against civil society, against activists. And not only demonizing activists, not only demonizing civil society, but generally demonizing the democratic values in general. It was a huge process of demonizing aspirations that, if you want a democracy … And this was all generated just only by the previous former authorities, but also Russia. That, okay, if you want a democracy, you had wars. This was there after the revolution.
Max Levites (06:31):
Yeah. Was there a lot of coordination among those different, not just civil society actors, but all the different actors who were involved?
Gayane Abrahamyan (06:38):
Actually, yeah. There was not really much coordination. But the interesting thing is that there were sat several principles. This was also the guarantee for some success.
(06:52):
First of all, the most important principle that should be established, and it was there during the revolution, was nonviolence method. Because if you even attempt any violent action, the state will use much greater force against you. Strategically, using force is the shortest way to weaken yourself. That is what, during any campaign, organizers should exclude all possible cases of violent action. This was the main principles during the revolution of 2018. Absolutely no violence. Not only interpersonal incidents should not be allowed, but breaking into any store.
(07:40):
In our case, often happened that people really angrily wanted to attack on businesses, stores of those who were part of the oligarchy, who were part of that kleptocratic system. Because they knew that stores, huge buildings were actually their taxes or the budget money, et cetera, that was stolen from them. But we were communicating with people, making them understand that it’s unacceptable. We actually viewed it as a provocation and immediately isolating those who were trying to do something violent, or to call for any violence. Tried to explain that it would simply give the police an opportunity the stop the demonstrations or to stop the actions, arrest them, or use force or even shoot.
(08:42):
In other words, the coordination, main coordination was done by several activists. But the main understanding, generally within the public because this was the first and most important principle, that there should be no violence. That’s why, actually, the Armenian Revolution during first period we were naming the Revolution of Love and Tolerance. This was actually one of the key aspects. But we have another, also several principles as well. But more or less, more tactic principles.
(09:24):
The second important approach was the decentralization of the campaigns. The demonstrations and actions were not only carried out in any square. Because we used to have big square rallies, where the speeches were given by the leaders, et cetera. But this time, this was really different. We called people, both civil society organizations, both the political leaders, Pashinian, and his partners and colleagues, in different parts of the city, in different parts of the country, different communities just to block streets.
(10:04):
This was really important approach and this was really working in Armenia. It will be workable for or visible for those countries where television companies or broadcasting companies, generally large media outlets are under control. In our case, it was because we were actually under media blockade. During the first few weeks, for example, of the revolution, people were very little informed because five or six years ago, the television or broadcasting media was considered the main source of information for the Armenian public. Now actually, the informational behavior has been changed now, for social media and YouTube is prevailing. But back then, traditional media, and especially broadcasting media was more influential.
(11:01):
That’s why this decentralizing of the actions campaigns, moving from the big squares to the streets, small parts of different districts gave an opportunity to people just to see what is going on from their own windows. To see that the process has started and they can join the strikers.
(11:24):
There is another important approach in this decentralization tactics. There was also decentralization of responsibilities. When you ask that, “Was there some coordination,” et cetera, this was a revolution of decentralization tactics. There was a coordination, but the coordination was not made very directly. Just setting up or setting down some principles. The main principle was nonviolence and decentralization. Every person was part of the struggle in his own area. One had a sense, also, a sense of ownership towards the struggle. One was not just only participating in the large demonstrations square, where the leaders of the movement were giving speeches. But everyone actually become the leader of the process. This was also important from point of view of involving people, giving them an ownership of the process.
(12:35):
Also, the last part of the coordination actually was an important tactic of legal support for the public, for activists. During all actions of demonstrations and campaigns, at least 200 demonstrators were detained every day, daily. We had daily, around 200, even more detainees in police stations. We were assured that they would be prevented from going out on the streets again using pressure, threats, or other methods because we knew that police would do that, and pushing people not to go out after they’re released from police stations. In other words, if the main goal of the campaign was to bring many people out to the streets, then it was also necessary to ensure the protection of participants’ rights.
(13:35):
I organized the mobilizing group in our club, Article 3 Club, with our partner NGOs, such as Transparency International. We created a hotline, a rapid response team, gathering groups of volunteer lawyers who were in police stations any moment, any hour possible. They were available and providing legal protection to all detained activists.
(14:04):
We often organize groups of activists, some rallies, just outside of police stations, near the buildings of police stations, in order to encourage from outside the activists that were detained just to make them sure that they are not alone, so they are protected. After they will be released, they will join others. This was another tactic which we used in this case. I do think this was really important because otherwise, if people would understand, activists would understand that, okay, they are detained. They are alone against very, very brutal police so next time, they would not join the street.
(14:52):
During that two months of rallies, we could mobilize and get support from around 62 lawyers. They all work pro bono, helping around 2000 activists. This was the main coordination.
Max Levites (15:09):
Yeah. I love this idea that protesters and citizens had ownership of revolution and the mobilization in their areas. But then they felt supported by civil society, who had their back if they got into trouble.
(15:20):
Around the principle of nonviolence and some of these other principles that you mentioned, was that decided by a small group of civil society leaders and spread out to the larger group coordinating things? Or did it just spread organically? Can you talk a little bit more about that?
Gayane Abrahamyan (15:35):
Yes. Actually, this principle was still there since 2008, when we had a problem and we had a very tragic situation when police, when the state killed 10 protesters during the rallies. Their main rational, and they were trying to provide some legit because there were lots of cases in European Human Rights Court. The main rational was that, “Okay, the protesters were using some force. They had tools or a weapon,” et cetera, et cetera.
[NEW_PARAGRAPH]After it, we understand that we have to make sure that the police, or the state, or the authorities have not any legitimate reason to shoot, and to use a force against protesters. This was very organic within the civil society, and also this was the main tactic or the main principle also for the political party, for My Step campaign. This was not really discussed within two groups leaders, but actually this was the very organic process and messaging coming from different parts. From civil society, and also political party. Very organic.
Max Levites (17:02):
Yeah. It sounds like there’s a lot of good lessons learned from previous. That’s really interesting to hear as well.
(17:08):
From what I understand, there was a lot of notable participation by youth, and women, and other marginalized groups in these protests, and everyone really came out. Was there any intentional outreach to groups who were traditionally less active in protests? Or what spurred their participation in them?
Gayane Abrahamyan (17:24):
Everything was really very organic. There was some people, the main tactic was decentralization. People, the main message was that, “You have to join, you have to protect your rights. You have to own the process. This is your ownership.” We were also doing it against, first target were universities. The second target were companies, private companies. But we were not really targeting the private companies because we were not sure, because they all were dependent from the government. But not only just dependent from the government, but they were owned by authorities. That’s why we’re saying oligarchic authorities, because also the economy were in their hands. That’s why our main target were just society.
(18:25):
There were some groups. For example, we had a special rally of mothers with their kids. Special rallies of people with disabilities, with their wheelchairs. There were some special rallies, but not that much.
Max Levites (18:49):
Obviously, the revolution was a success and there was a change in government. Can you talk about some of the lessons that other people interested in fostering collective action against kleptocracy can take from the Armenian case?
Gayane Abrahamyan (19:00):
Of course. It was a huge success, and we couldn’t even dream of this 10 years ago. But we cannot say that it was followed by radical reforms. Actually, no, unfortunately. This is something that should be learned by others. One step is to do the revolution. Another step is to keep the commitments given during the revolution. Because this revolution was mainly about the democracy, mainly against the corruption, against the kleptocracy. But what the next step the government had a commitment to do, transitional justice had a commitment to do, very radical judiciary reforms and also, revealing all the corruption cases, et cetera. But because, actually, lots of other priorities occurred during the process, they really failed to do real reforms. That’s why we cannot say that actually, the democratic processes cannot be changed.
(20:09):
Actually, after the revolution, since 2020, Armenia faced terrible existential security threats, a war, the loss of historical homeland, ethnic cleansing. Today also, daily danger threats of a new war we are facing. In this situation, it is almost impossible to talk about serious institutional reforms. Of course, the former and previous centralized oligarchic regime and systemic corruption systems have been overcome.
(20:41):
While impunity of former regime creates an extremely high risks for the formation of a new corruption system. Until now, no one in reality, is under jail from the former authorities. This was because the judicial system was also part of the corruption system. Their political interdependency from the former regime created the whole chain of impunity. This is something that should be really taken in account for others. That, okay, if you have success, it doesn’t really means that later, you will have success.
(21:26):
Unfortunately, yeah, we cannot say effective institutional boundaries have been created to fight corruption. There an anti-corruption committee as an independent body, but it’s not that much functioning, or separate and specialized anti-corruption courts, or prosecutor’s office. But we cannot say really much about the serious results. This is something I would really push for, just to be sure that there are specific commitments and these commitments should be kept after the success.
Max Levites (22:05):
Yeah. I think it’s definitely well-noted that a lot of these big movements have some initial successes and short term successes, but unfortunately, peter out after a while and don’t live up to the high expectations. That’s well-noted, for sure.
(22:19):
There were obviously some big initial success in overturning government. In actually that collective action, can you talk about some potential lessons to take away from how it all came together initially and achieve those initial objectives?
Gayane Abrahamyan (22:31):
The most important part is to set some principles. Because in some situations, sometimes it’s really impossible to control all the processes. It’s really important just to have some very simple principles and to be very strict to keep that principles, and to leave people to have that on their shape of the process.
(22:56):
I think mainly, in such situations, it’s the most important to have like minded people around. Also, to set some values. We had a situation, for example, when we have the same goal but the understanding the methods were totally different. For example, in 2016, we had a situation that, okay, they were struggling against the government, against the corrupt system. While that political or civic activists groups, their main understanding was that they have to shoot the government, which was totally not in line with what others, and that’s why we couldn’t even support each other. But the goal was the same. That’s why it’s really important to have and to work with those who you have the same values. Democratic values, protection of human rights.
(24:01):
And also, the most important part are be sure that you’re having some groups or some responsible people that are doing a fact-checking. Because during any process of campaigning, or activism, et cetera, there will be, of course, huge hybrid threats, huge fake news, fake narratives. That was the main reason, for example, during that period or previously, and now also our organization, are mainly focused on media literacy. Making people know that they can be cheated. They can be really manipulated by authorities. And also in our case, now also there is a huge spread of Russian fake news, Russian soft power, et cetera, et cetera. It’s really important to make sure that during the campaigns or during the demonstrations, you have some responsible people or some organizations that are doing fact-checking and very quickly making people understand that there is fake information there, or a fake narrative also.
(25:17):
Because we have that disappointment. We all were having huge hopes that, just after the revolution, all the problems will be solved very quickly, et cetera. The fundamental approach that should be taken is that still, you have to struggle. It’s really important not to think that after the one success, or one cycle of success only, you will change everything.
Max Levites (25:46):
I think that’s such an important point, yeah. The fight for democracy never ends.
Gayane Abrahamyan (25:50):
Yes.
Max Levites (25:51):
Well, thank you again, Gayane, for being here. This was a very insightful conversation.
Gayane Abrahamyan (25:56):
Thank you. Thank you for having me.
Announcer (25:58):
Thank you for listening to this podcast. For more episodes from the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy Series, and the full report with case studies, please visit acgc.cipe.org. That’s A-C-G-C.C-I-P-E.org.
Published Date: September 19, 2024