Tajikistan’s Old Challenges for the New Generation

» June 12th, 2007 2:52 pm by Anna Nadgrodkiewicz

last week the NED hosted a presentation by Nigina Bakhrieva, director of the Republican Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, a Dushanbe-based nongovernmental organization. She talked about the challenges to her line of work during the country’s turbulent history since independence in 1991 in the context of the brutal 1992-1997 civil war, in which over 50,000 people died and 800,000 were displaced. But her remarks made me think about a broader topic: the implications of armed conflict for the post-conflict political and economic reform.

Needless to say, war is always a great tragedy on a humanitarian level, where in the end the body count and destruction may be all that’s left. Once the guns are silent, though, a new chapter starts for the survivors, who need to carry on but are not necessarily given a fresh start. Instead, they have to work within the constraints of the war’s outcome, or – as a Nobel Prize winning poet Wisława Szymborska put it bluntly – clean up the mess:

    After every war
    someone has to tidy up.
    Things won’t pick
    themselves up, after all.

Not every conflict outcome is a catalyst for positive political and economic change the way, say, the end of World War II was for Germany and Japan. Far more frequently, conflicts (especially civil wars) end with uneasy stalemates, create more chaos, or reinforce the pre-war status quo. The latter seems to be the case in Tajikistan, where in spite of the bloodshed there hasn’t really been a chance to fundamentally redefine the institutions of the state. The country’s post-Soviet government — and governance — has remained virtually untouched by the war: authoritarian president Emomali Rahmon has been in power since 1992, one-party rule system persists, and the opposition is suppressed. Hence, the ruling elite in charge of the post-conflict “tidying up” efforts only strengthened its grip on power as a result of the conflict and has little incentive to reform.

It comes as no surprise that Tajikistan disappointingly resembles many other post-conflict countries, where foreign aid earmarked for reconstruction has been significant and yet the results leave a lot to wish for as far as meaningful democratic and market reforms. As the new generation enters adulthood (35% of Tajikistan’s population is under the age of 15), one of the key questions it will have to answer is how to transition from relying on humanitarian relief to broad-based development anchored domestically. In the light of experiences of other post-conflict countries (see CIPE’s Feature Service article), the way forward needs to include improving business environment through increasing the private sector’s dialogue with the government on the necessary economic policies. The problem remains, however, how to accomplish that in a country which is less then democratic and where the idea of activism is associated with the memories of anti-government demonstrations and rallies that sparked the civil war.

A small-step approach based on cooperation rather than confrontation between the private sector and the government on specific policy areas seems to be a place to start. After all, wide-spread poverty breeds discontent and that is something any government mindful of the threat of more civil unrest would want to avoid. Therefore, there is a chance that at least some progress can be made on policies meant to reduce informal sector, empower entrepreneurs, and so on, helping to create the mechanisms allowing the population to lift itself out of poverty.

Back to Ms. Bakhrieva’s talk: although her work focuses on human rights NGOs, she had a few valuable recommendations for foreign donors which can be applied to other reform areas, including international organizations working with the private sector. First, there is the need for flexibility for the local organizations to design their own programs and strategies. This on-the-ground leadership provides the sense of ownership and helps to incorporate unique local knowledge of the country’s circumstances to design the most impactful solutions. Second, the sense of partnership between the donor and recipient organizations is necessary, so that the latter does not act as a proxy blindly implementing top-down approaches. Finally, emphasis on working with the young people, for whom the memory of the divisive bloody conflict will become more and more distant as time goes by, is crucial, since (to quote Szymborska again) the war-torn generation of…

    those who knew what this was all about
    must make way for those
    who know little.
    And less than that.
    And at last nothing less than nothing.

And that new generation may be the country’s best chance for progress.

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2 Responses to “Tajikistan’s Old Challenges for the New Generation”

  1. Global Voices Online » Tajikistan: Development is the top priority Says:

    [...] development of the country are very often improperly used and in result the goals are not achieved. Anna Nadgrodkiewicz on the CIPE Development blog gives general recommendations for the donors. She points to three important things which donors [...]

  2. Peter Humphrey Says:

    Nadgrodkiewicz is correct in embracing the lens through which she views Tajikistan. That beleaguered land may benefit most from more of a grass roots and less of a World Bankish approach–with special emphasis on its increasingly savvy youth: micro-lending and non-madrassa education may well pay the biggest dividends here.

    We cannot forget, however, the essential integration between the independent Tajiks and those who stand suzerain over a large sector of neighboring Afghanistan. Certainly borders separate common peoples the world over, but here the commonality and intercourse is paramount to an uncommon degree. To wit, as Afghan Tajiks go, so goes the kindred nation next door (and vice-versa?): it is hard to imagine one sector of this population advancing without a concomitant advance by their cross-border brethren. Donors may have to view the Tajik development problem as one.

    This is key in large measure because of the common narcotics routing. No Tajik development enterprise can ignore the sad reality that a substantial proportion of current Tajik ingress results from the production (Afghanistan) and transit (Tajikistan) of unrefined base destined for distant lands. Sadly, a substantial fraction of Tajik development may well result from “trickle down” off the opiate trail–those on the receiving end of payments will still do much of their spending–and bribing–locally. This raises (1) the spectre that a fully successful assault on illegal pharmacology might actually collapse these economies for a time and (2) the challenge that any development partnership must try to offer more lucrative and safer enterprises wherever possible–no mean feat.

    Iran’s key role in first promulgating and then settling Tajikistan’s civil war suggests a degree of influence that surely endures and Persian regional aspirations will look askance at any drift toward the development coffers of the West. There will be times when Iran will seek to make an even better deal with the locals simply to stiffle Western influence.

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