HANDBOOK
ANTI-CORRUPTION DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK

ELISKA DRAPALOVA
ROBERTO MARTINEZ KUKUTSCHKA
The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) strengthens democracy around the globe through private enterprise and market-oriented reform. CIPE is one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy. Since 1983, CIPE has worked with business leaders, policymakers, and civil society to build the institutions vital to a democratic society. CIPE’s key program areas include enterprise ecosystems, democratic governance, business advocacy, and anti-corruption and ethics.

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INTRODUCTION

HOW TO APPLY THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK

» Diagnostic framework components:

1. Regime Diagnosis: a mixture of quantitative and qualitative indicators showing whether favoritism is the rule or the exception in government transactions, as well as whether the status quo is a stable equilibrium or transition.

2. Index of Public Integrity: Control of Corruption framework (constraints and opportunities - indicators).

3. Stakeholder analysis: Identifying the winners and losers in the corrupt system as well as the system’s gatekeepers, brokers, patrons and clients. This analysis shows who has an interest in changing the status quo and where change is most likely to happen.

4. Policy Analysis: Identifying the options for intervention, whether it be an action focusing on a principal-agent (in situations where corruption is the exception) or applying a collective action solution (institutionalized corruption).

» Definitions of Corruption:

Corruption is both a governance problem and a policy failure. Governance is understood as the institutional arrangement that determines who gets what and how. This definition implies the role of “good government” to maximize social welfare and provide for equal opportunities while protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and preventing violence. Corruption thwarts all these efforts.
Corruption has many definitions, classifications, and typologies (see Glossary). Each definition focuses on aspects of corruption, such as actors (petty, grand, crony), purpose (extortive, collusive), frequency, and areas affected. Transparency International and many organizations and scholars define corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. Although this definition reflects the primary character of corrupt exchanges, it conceives corruption at a more individual level, reflecting individual weighing of costs, benefits and opportunities. For an analysis of regimes and countries, we need to adapt this definition to a societal level. Therefore, in this framework, we will focus on Alina Mungiu-Pippidi’s definition of corruption. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi defines corruption as ‘systematic abuse of public authority to divert public resources meant for universal use and social welfare maximization for the benefit of particular private interests (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).’ This definition conceives corruption at the level of society (as opposed to a sum of individual interactions and decisions), which makes it suitable for this framework and control of corruption analysis.

Component of Corruption:

1. Both public and private parties are involved.
2. The line between public and private is blurred.
3. Undue benefit to involved parties (official, private interests).
4. Illegality (breaking formal rules).
5. A social cost either in the form of discrimination (where a particular group or individual loses out because of corrupt allocation) or an opportunity cost to the detriment of public resources and/or breaking rules.

Corruption is very difficult to eradicate completely. Societies that have low corruption have succeed because they control corruption and keep it at low levels. Thus, control of corruption is a never-ending effort. This document focuses on controlling corruption; the capacity of a given society to keep corruption an exception instead of the rule.²

¹ For alternative definitions of corruption see the references provided.
² The rule of law is ethical universalism applied to law, while control of corruption is applied to public goods/resources.
Any anti-corruption effort must first understand the social-political context, the role of corruption in the society (usually to gain advantage or access to public goods), and the underlying logic of corruption in a society. As will be reiterated many times, researchers must identify whether corrupt exchanges are the norm (particularism), or whether corruption is an exceptional deviation by individuals or a few state agencies (ethical universalism). When diagnosing the extent of corruption, the researcher should focus on 6-5 areas that will give an overview of corruption risk zones. These areas will help to diagnose whether a country, region or city is more particularist or whether the allocation of resources is based on meritocracy and the rule of law. Additional questions should include: How distinct is the separation between the public and private sector? How is power distributed? Which group or groups benefit disproportionately from the current system?

We have defined governance as the institutional arrangement that determines who gets what and how. Good governance should therefore aim at maximizing social welfare and enforcing equal opportunities while respecting property rights and not allowing any violence or power abuse. Following this conception, we can distinguish different governance and redistributive regimes along two opposite poles. In between these two categories we can distinguish several sub-types (see Table 1).

PARTICULARISM - a social practice rampant in developing societies, where standards for the way a person is treated (including by the state) depend on the group the person belongs to and not on merit. Particularism = Corruption is the rule/norm in societies where particularism informs most government transactions and the result is widespread favoritism and discrimination.
ETHICAL UNIVERSALISM – often the practice of individualistic societies, this norm supports more equal treatment regardless of group identity Ethical universalism = Corruption is the exception. In these societies, corruption is usually an individual behavior where a public authority is abused to result in undue private profit.

We have created five areas that define the governance regime. These areas will help us to understand whether one country or region is closer to Particularism or Ethical universalism. It will also help to situate the country/region in one of the four broad categories and link them with the anti-corruption approach (Principal Agent or Collective Action).

1. Power distribution & pluralism (cartels, moguls, etc.): the electoral democracy and functioning checks and balances.

2. State autonomy (Separation between the private and public sectors).

3. System of public allocation (services, goods) — pork barrel, clientelism, discretionary funds (disasters).


5. Social acceptability of corruption.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>LIMITED ACCESS ORDER</th>
<th>OPEN ACCESS ORDER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Autonomy and separation of private and public:</td>
<td>» State captured by the ruler.</td>
<td>» State captured in turn by winners of elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Permeable border; patrimonialism is usually the norm and conflict of interest is ubiquitous (individuals often belong to both groups at the same time).</td>
<td>» Use of public budget for private goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of services and public goods:</td>
<td>Particular and predictable.</td>
<td>Particular but unpredictable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. POWER DISTRIBUTION:

Equal distribution of powers and their plurality are the basis for functioning checks and balances. Power distribution refers to how resources, administrative and political office, ownership of state resources and political influence are distributed across the political factions, ethnic and societal groups. In short, whether resources (political, economic) and positions within the state administration are concentrated in a narrow and (ethnically) defined group or whether they are redistributed equally among competing groups in society. In regimes closer to the particularistic ends, power tends to concentrate in one narrow group of actors. Under universalism, resources, offices and political powers tend to be more dispersed and balance each other.

This dimension has two sub-elements: electoral democracy with competitive elections and formal checks and balances.

To diagnose the degree of power distribution, the researcher can ask the following guiding questions:

» Is political influence distributed unevenly, resulting in constant preferential treatment of certain groups by the state?

» Does only one group (network/estate) enjoy privileges’?

» Is this consistent over time, or does it change according to elections?

» Is there a particular group that constantly loses due to power inequality?

» Is autonomy sufficient for a ‘loser’ group to exercise its voice?

The researcher should find suitable indicators or proxies to diagnose the degree of power concentration and map the progress over time after the intervention.
INDICATORS:

A. ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY COMPONENT:

» The long-term predominance of one party, absence of elections or electoral competition.
  
  • Is one party governing for more than ten years (lack or political alternation)
  
  • Electoral democracy indicators (Polity IV indicator of the existence of competitive elections)

  • Election vote-buying. Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? (source: V-Dem)

» Persistence of widespread popular perceptions of government corruption despite changes in government. Opinion surveys asking about the perception about corruption levels in government and meritocracy (see the Eurobarometer, Enterprise survey for economic sector, Global Corruption Barometer)

  • Question from GCB: To what extent do you believe corruption is a problem in the public sector in your country?
  [1=Not a problem at all; 5 ;4 ;3 ;2=Very serious problem]

  • How seriously do you believe corruption affects different spheres of life in this country?
  [1=Not significantly; 2=Somewhat significantly; 3=Very significantly; 9=Don’t know/No answer]
B. CHECKS AND BALANCES

» Independence of Judiciary:
  - Independent judiciary index: Judicial independence indicator from the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Dataset. This indicator asks the question “To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms? [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent].

» Accountability and Executive Constraints: Are the executive powers controlled by the Parliament?
  - Executive constraints (Polity IV)

» Influential jobs held by the same individuals or networks regardless of the outcome of elections.
  - How many influential public positions are named by the governing group without ant consultation with the opposition or other bodies. (Director of National Bank, Secret Services, Army, Police, Judges, Supreme Audit Office, Director of National TV, Radio and telecommunications, Ombudsman). Are these positions covered by people party members of the incumbent, linked to governing party or independent experts?

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3 Alternative indicator: Global Integrity. In practice, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed
4 Authors’ data collection
» Certain influential positions held by status groups or excluding other groups? Staffing of strategic public position should be based on merit and competency. The indicators should establish whether these positions are staffed based on different criteria like political affiliation, economic status, ethnicity. These can indicate a corruption risk.

- Is one ethnicity or one family group accumulating more strategic public positions?

- In practice, is/are the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections protected from political interference? (source: QoG data and Global Integrity)

» Legal impunity for specific people/families/groups regardless of their crimes.

- Are politicians that were a charge of corruption judged and convicted or absolved? Q: In practice, heads of state and government are investigated and prosecuted while in the office if evidence suggests they committed a crime. (source: QoG data and Global Integrity for 57 countries)
2. STATE AUTONOMY & SEPARATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC:

In a universalistic system where corruption is controlled, the boundaries between public and private are separated and distinguished. This means that public administration and state institutions operate without the interference from political parties and/or business community. The use of public resources and office is strictly regulated. The bureaucracy is independent of political pressure protected by civil service laws and hiring is based on meritocratic recruitment. This area also monitors the intersection between business and politics. In a universalist regime, businesses operate in an open and competitive market. They do not depend nor use the political sphere as a medium for business. The lobby is regulated by law. However, a revolving door\(^5\) practice or an un-transparent lobby may be taking place.

On the other hand, where particularism is established the public and private sphere as well as the relationship between the civil administration and political leaders are blended. Consequently, politicians or businesspeople use government resources to serve private interests. These practices include clientelism, crony capitalism, state capture. The administration is politicized and lacks independence (resulting in large amounts of hiring and firing after elections).

**CRONY CAPITALISM** is associated with a market distortion due to connections to political power. Under crony capitalism selected economic elites receive preferential treatment and privileges, thus making support from the state rather than market forces the most crucial factor for obtaining and maintaining wealth.

**STATE CAPTURE** - A situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to influence a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their private interests.

**CLIENTELISM** - An unequal system of exchanging resources and favors based on an exploitative relationship between a wealthier and/or more powerful ‘patron’ and a less wealthy and weaker ‘client’.

\(^5\) (See Glossary) The term ‘revolving door’ refers to the movement or individuals between positions of public office and jobs in the same sector in the private or voluntary sector, in either direction. If not properly regulated, it can be open to abuse. A cooling-off period is a minimum time required between switching from the public to the private sector intended to discourage the practice and minimize its impact.
Questions for diagnostics:

» Is there a permanent autonomous bureaucracy that does not change with elections and how much influence does it have over policy formulation and implementation?

» Is the administration politicized and the public sector in general? Do politicians have a say on hiring, firing, promotion and salaries, or is it the civil service law? At what level of government (national, regional, local) is the administration politicized?

» To what extent is the norm that a public position or advantage is passed down in a family or used for family profit?

» Is the state autonomous from, or captured by private interests (businesses, lobbyist) or politicians’?

» Do businesspeople, tycoon or groups of entrepreneurs have direct and privileged access to policymakers and influence policy outcome?

» Is the practice of ‘revolving doors’ (passage from politics to business) frequent in your case?

Moreover, this dimension can be divided into two groups: (1) Administrative autonomy (from political influence) and (2) State Autonomy from Business (i.e. open competitive markets); including the negative examples of state capture, crony capitalism and revolving doors.

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This set of questions helps the researcher characterize or position the country. The questions can also be used for expert interviews. In this case, the questions should be asked to actors who have access to information and an interest in disclosing them with minimal bias or alteration. Look for losers of the system: businessmen, political opposition members or leaders, and dismissed civil servants. When press freedom exists, journalists are often the most resourceful. Professors of law, criminology, or political science are also frequently asked by international organizations to evaluate national regimes and have access to useful information. When asking these questions, keep in mind both the integrity and the security of the interviewer and interviewees. The questions presented here are designed to be of a general and neutral character and should not be harmful. They should be asked in a neutral way/in neutral terms. None of the questions specifically mention “corruption”.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY (FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE):

– **DE JURE:**

» Existence of civil service laws that create the status of public employees establish their hiring and firing process and promotion? Was the civil service law enacted?

- Question N 39. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria. (source: QoG data and Global Integrity)
- Question N 37. In law, there are formal rules to prevent conflicts of interest, nepotism, cronyism and patronage in all branches of government. (source: QoG data and Global Integrity).

– **DEGREE OF POLITICIZATION:**

» Top-level patronage in the state apparatus: Degree of politicization of public service at ministerial level (central government), nepotism and favoritism.

- Question N 38. In practice, civil servants’ work is not compromised by political interference. (source: QoG data and Global Integrity)

» Personal reshuffling: to what level personnel reshuffling occurs after elections and government change.

- The extent of personnel change in top administrative posts after elections (check after the elections which top civil servants and directors of public companies are removed). For example, the number or civil servants that were tired and hired after elections.
» Use of administrative resources for private goals. Disproportionate fortunes of officials compared to their official income. In other words, do civil servants use public resources for personal enrichment? As it is difficult to observe and measure, this indicator focuses on the de jure existence of laws that would limit the risk of corruption by forcing civil servants to disclose their assets.

- Are personal assets disclosed? Is there a law that obliges politicians and top civil servants to disclose their assets?
- Q: N 47. In practice, the asset disclosure process for members of the civil service is effective. (source: QoG data and Global Integrity).

B. STATE AUTONOMY FROM BUSINESS (I.E. OPEN COMPETITIVE MARKETS)

In Open Access Regimes, profits of companies, the price of products etc. are determined by their competition on open and competitive markets, and not by the privileged access to state representatives, information or state resources. In the particularistic regime, the state capture by narrow vested interests is frequent. The suggested indicators look at the degree of conversion of authority into wealth, or the extent that rulers and politicians are also successful private entrepreneurs. This can be also observed by measuring the market share of businesses with strong political ties.

» Business influence on Political Parties:

- Question N 49. In practice, political parties regularly disclose public donations (funds that are sourced from the government) and the disclosures are easily available to the public. (Source: Global Integrity)
- Revolving door practice: Repeated transfers between private sector (business, think tanks) and public sector (politics, public administration). - see glossary.
- Question N 40. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government. (Source: Global Integrity)
C. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

The researcher can also combine or select one of the indicators:

» The Crony Capitalist Index by the Economist, available for 23 countries only

OR

» Crony capitalism - Questions:
  • Who are the ones who have succeeded in the competition under liberalization?
  • Who have been the principal drivers of changes in the corporate sector? Do old business groups that had flourished under the old economic policy regime prosper?
  • Alternatively, has liberalization provided a friendly environment for a new breed of entrepreneurs to grow and establish themselves? Have such new entrepreneurs grown purely on the strength of their entrepreneurship or have other factors outside the economic sphere contributed to their success?

OR

» Winners of the economy:
  • Identify the 10 richest people in the country and map the source of their fortune (i.e. gift of the state, inherited, privatization, market and innovation, finance). Observe their connection to the public sector and decide whether there is a clear link between the business fortunes and their connection to the state or governing party (Source: National Forbes).
OR

» Business undue influence:

Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) have questions on undue influence.

- GCR: In your country, to what extent do government officials show favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?  
  \[1 = \text{show favoritism to a great extent}; \ 7 = \text{do not show favoritism at all}\]

- GCB question: How often do you think the private sector/business use bribery to influence government policies, laws or regulations?  
  \[1=\text{Never}; \ 2=\text{Seldom}; \ 3=\text{Sometimes}; \ 4=\text{Often}; \ 5=\text{Almost always}; \ 9= \text{Don’t know/No response}\]
It is important to understand how public goods, subsidies, services and contracts are awarded and distributed. In a meritocratic regime, services and contracts are awarded impartially and according to the law to the most competitive bidder, or to a person that performs best based on given criteria. One can imagine that the public services should be distributed as if it were done by a computer on an objective analysis of qualifications. On the contrary, in a particularistic regime public resources and subsidies are used to reinforce the government’s grip on power and control over the population and businesses. Resources and funds are distributed according to party lines or as a reward for electoral support. This dimension focuses on the existence of FAVORITISM and CLIENTELISM or PORK-BARREL POLITICS in public spending services allocation, and similar partisan and partial practices.

Questions for diagnostics:

» How are public goods allocated? Are clear rules in place? Do these rules follow competitive and clear-cut procedures?

» Pork barrel politics: Does the party/clan in government distribute mostly to itself (associated local governments or regions, favorite companies)?

» Is the main goal of the state to cater to everyone, or to special interests or groups?

» How much of the total spending budget are rents?

» Is it customary that rulers/officials to use public funds (or administrative resources) to cover private expenses? Is there any public scrutiny or disclosure of such expenses? Is there any moral outrage at such disclosures, or is the practice accepted?

» Are policy formulation and public spending processes transparent and observable by media and citizens?
ANTI-CORRUPTION DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK

FAVORITISM: Favoritism is frequently observed in public procurement. One can ask whether are the same companies linked to the government winning the public contracts? Is a competitive procurement in place or there is always one of few companies getting contracts?

» Can unconnected people get access to public service without bribing? (Interview or survey question)

- Global Corruption Barometer: are you expected to give a bribe to receive public services (health, police, education, license).

This section requires knowledge and public data of procurement. Frequently journalists and anti-corruption activist have data on this issue.

PROCUREMENT FAVORITISM

- Find the 10 companies that are winning the biggest public procurement in a sector. See whether they are domestic or international, who owns them, are politicians on the board of these companies? Are these companies always winning? Observe whether same companies win in cities or regions with one specific party in government, OR,

- In law, major public procurements require competitive bidding.

- In practice, major public procurements involve competitive bidding (Source: Global Integrity)

- Corruption Risk Indicator (CRI) indicator of the existence of single bidding or uncompetitive bidding in public procurement (available in Europe also at subnational levels)

PORK BARREL ALLOCATION: Government politically motivated subnational transfers per government/opposition areas and Pork barrel allocations by MPs (clientelism indicators).

- Do regions, cities that support the governing party receiving more funds?— Look for centrally distributed funds like EU funds, mean tested funds for poverty alleviation, structural funds to build roads or the disaster relieve funds. (These indicators are not generally available, but the researcher can look at their cases whether there are articles or research available). Alternatively, one can approach this question, also looking at the end-users.
4. SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CORRUPTION IN SOCIETY

What is the role of corruption within the social interaction and to what purpose? Does corruption serve to get access to basic services and contracts that should be otherwise provided for free? Does corruption serve to «skip the line» or get preferential treatment or preferential access to markets?

**INDICATORS:**

- Question N 10. In law, corruption is criminalized as a specific offence (Source: Global Integrity)
- Variable: Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Someone accepting a bribe in the course or their duties (World Value Survey)

This regime diagnosis helps you to understand the context of governance. In other words, it helps you to understand what to expect and what logic should be applied to understand corruption and how to design anti-corruption policies. Too often one size fits all approach is applied with no understanding in which stage the society is in terms of control of corruption and development. This often led to ineffective and even counterproductive measures. It also provides a first basic analysis of specific policy areas that would need addressing and logic under which corruption operates.
### TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF REGIME TYPES AND CORRESPONDING MODELS OF CORRUPTION

<table>
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<th>Regime</th>
<th>What to Expect:</th>
<th>Models of Corruption:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Particularism</strong></td>
<td>Power is centralized and monopolized. State is captured and administration is not independent. Public services are provided according to loyalty to the system. Corruption occurs mainly to get access to the system/services. <strong>REFORM:</strong> if the ruler, despot, principal is interested in anti-corruption, fast implementation – but it cannot threaten power.</td>
<td>Principal Actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitive Particularism</strong></td>
<td>Main problems here is uncertainty and instability that impedes effective anti-corruption. In this situation, the change is difficult or will not last long as a new faction might revert reforms.</td>
<td>Collective Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borderline</strong></td>
<td>Co-existence of universalism and particularism. Islands of effectiveness and good government. Here collective action and critical mass are extremely important together with an IPI approach.</td>
<td>Collective Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universalism</strong></td>
<td>Well-functioning checks and balances, autonomous administration in most sectors. Possible islands of bad governance (possible sector capture or problem with revolving doors)</td>
<td>Principal Actor</td>
</tr>
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### TABLE 3: SUMMARY TABLE OF GOVERNMENT REGIMES, INDICATORS AND SOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature of Governance Regime</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POWER DISTRIBUTION/ DISCRETION (CHECKS + BALANCES)</strong></td>
<td>- Electoral democracy indicators&lt;br&gt;- Degree of pluralism&lt;br&gt;- Independence of judiciary&lt;br&gt;- Top level patronage&lt;br&gt;- Legal impunity&lt;br&gt;- Gov’t accountability (checks + balances)</td>
<td>- Polity IV/GCB&lt;br&gt;- Freedom House Global Competitiveness&lt;br&gt;- Dataset WEF&lt;br&gt;- QoG&lt;br&gt;- Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE AUTONOMY TOWARDS PRIVATE INTERESTS</strong></td>
<td>- Strength/quality of bureaucracy&lt;br&gt;- Meritocratic hiring process&lt;br&gt;- Crony capitalism</td>
<td>- ICRG/PRS&lt;br&gt;- QoG&lt;br&gt;- The Economist, Global Competitiveness Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEPARATION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS</strong></td>
<td>- Nepotism&lt;br&gt;- Revolving Door</td>
<td>- GCB Media/Global Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES</strong></td>
<td>- Diversion/corruption of public funds (GCR) / Government favoritism&lt;br&gt;- Equal access to public services</td>
<td>- WEF/Corruption Risk Indicator GCB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CORRUPTION IN SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td>- Criminalization of corruption</td>
<td>- Global Integrity/WVS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. IPI AND CONTROL OF CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

Depending on the corruption regime of a given country, we can understand corruption as the exception or the norm. Depending on these two scenarios which define the predominance of corruption in society, we can apply two different underlying logics of corruption:

» The Principal-Agent models
» Collective Action equilibrium models.

Corruption is the exception: The logic of corruption follows what is called in the literature a Principal-Agent Framework:

- This model assumes that corrupt officials are agents with poor incentives to act on behalf of the principal (i.e. the public).
- The principal-agent theory is commonly used to explain bribery.
- The model highlights the importance of monitoring and sanctions: agents are more likely to perform their jobs without asking for bribes if sanctions are high, and the chances of being caught are high.
Corruption is widespread and viewed as a norm: The logic of corruption follows what in the literature is called Collective Action Framework. A growing number of authors argue that anti-corruption efforts have failed precisely because they are inspired by principal-agent theory and that collective action theory offers a better theoretical framework to understand and combat systematic corruption.

- When corruption is widely seen as the norm, individuals will have little to gain from resisting it if they cannot require others in their group, community or society to do the same.

To understand which logic of corruption operates in each case is crucial for the understanding of the mechanisms of corruption and for the effective control of corruption. For example, when corruption is a framed as principal-agent problem, the solution will focus on improving accountability, control mechanisms and transparency. Collective action framework, on the other hand, will follow much more complicated strategy that combines capacity building, coalition building and collective enforcement.

Corruption is a governance problem and we distinguish between individual and societal levels. At individual level corruption is an issue of benefits, opportunities and costs (PA), at social perspective corruption follows similar logic, the equilibrium between resources (economic and political) and institutional and societal constraints. Following the Alina Mungiu-Pippidi’s (2015): Control of corruption is an equilibrium reached when opportunities (resources) for corruption are checked/balanced by constraints imposed by state and society. In short, control of corruption equals the opportunities for corruption (discretionary power plus material resources) minus the legal and normative deterrents against corruption.

The control of corruption framework (basis for the Index of Public Integrity) determines the concrete problem or weak point in public integrity. In other words, whether corruption is a problem of excess or resources, lack of controls and constraints or both. This analysis will be the base for the definition of corruption as a policy problem and envisage a policy strategy to control corruption. The current academic research points to several theories about the causes of corruption. Many or those focus on quality of bureaucracy, economic development, rule of law, effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions. However, finding from case studies and current research show that none of these factors alone can reduce corruption in all the cases. These factors should be, instead, combined in an equilibrium model.
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION = Opportunities/Resources (administrative discretion and material resources) - Constraints (institutional and normative)

**Resources:**
In this model, resources for corruption include both material resources and discretionary power. These resources are privileged to access reduced groups of actors, intentionally poor regulation or its excess, lack of transparency that transforms information into privileged capital for powerholders and their associates. The financial resources include discretionary budgets of presidents and ministries that can be used to finance supporters, discretionary legislative and executive powers concentrated in one or a limited number of persons.

**Constraints:**
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) distinguishes two types of restrictions. First, she distinguishes the dissuasive legal measures administered by the state and regions. These include responsible, effective and autonomous judicial power capable of enforcing legislation, auditing institutions, and a comprehensive body of laws dealing with conflicts of interest that make a clear separation between public and private spheres. Secondly, we have what Mungiu-Pippidi calls normative dissuasive measures. These include the existence of social norms that promote public integrity and government impartiality, as well as, monitoring of deviations from these norms through the public opinion, the media, civil society and a critical electorate.

The strongest formal constraints are functioning and independent courts. The politicians, especially the corrupt ones, are very aware of this. That is why it is exceptionally difficult to build independent judiciary without external pressure. It is also the reason why the judiciary together with the press are the first targets of corrupt politicians when they reach power. Moreover, free and independent press is the crucial watchdog that constraints the arbitrary exercise of power and its abuse. The civil society, especially the organized one, is an additional constraint to power. In contrast, the large-scale mobilizations and protest can build momentum and ‘scare’ the power. It is structured and organized civil society action that gives continuity to the popular check on power. These factors were operationalized and combined into Index of Public Integrity (IPI) by ERCAS. The diagnosis and policy analysis will be based on this index.
B. INDICATORS & ASSESSMENT OF CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

» **Resources for corruption:**

Natural resources: gold, oil, timber, rare metals, lithium, fishery

- % share or Budget by natural resources

Financial resources: Development funds, external funds, (EU regional funds)

- % share of Budget provided by IO development funds, EU or similar

Institutional resources: Administrative Burden

- Number of procedures required to start up a business for both men and women (averaged)
- The time needed to start up a business for both women and men (average)
- Number of tax payments per year
- Time to pay taxes
- Trade openness

- The extent of regulations concerning a country’s external economic activities; level of administrative trade barriers (number of procedures and time for exporting and importing)
Budget Transparency:

- Extent and the quality of public accessibility of the executive’s budget proposal; control mechanism for discretionary public spending (Open Budget Survey 2015 and own data)

**Constraints:**

Institutional constraints:

- Judiciary independence: Impartiality and independence of the overall judiciary system (IPI, Global Competitiveness Database 16-2015)
- Watchdogs Institutions: Freedom of the press, legal, political and economic environment of in which the local media operates (Freedom House 2015)

Normative Constraints:

- Civil society accountability: E-citizenship (Existence of E-governance, E-governance uptake by citizens), Internet access (% of the population with fixed broadband subscriptions, % of the population that use the internet frequently), Facebook users (% of the population). The first two variables were taken from the International Telecommunication Union’s ICT Dataset; the latter is from the Internet World Stats.

In order to assess the weaknesses and strength of individual components, the researcher can fill the results from analysis to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>LOW 0-40%</th>
<th>MEDIUM 40-75%</th>
<th>HIGH 75-100%</th>
<th>REGIONAL AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATURAL RESOURCES, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, POWER DISCRETION &amp; ACCUMULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCRETIONARY &amp; UNACCOUNTABLE CENTRAL BUDGETS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE OPENNESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>LOW 0-40%</th>
<th>MEDIUM 40-75%</th>
<th>HIGH 75-100%</th>
<th>REGIONAL AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATCHDOGS INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-CITIZENSHIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNET ACCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following the analysis, we can sort countries to one of four categories.

### TABLE 4: COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO COUNTRY’S DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR CORRUPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, UK, Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg</td>
<td>Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

» **Different paths for change:**

Depending on the quadrant, the country, region or city is placed, the reform path will be different (in the case of PA framework, look at specific sector). The reform process wants to achieve a successful control of corruption (upper-left quadrant).

- Increase constraints + limit opportunities = Big Push (most difficult, requires external shocks and assistance).
- Judicial + punishment path = increase constraints → limit opportunities.
- Starve and reduce resources path = decrease opportunities (resources) → increase constraints.

Specific anti-corruption policies should focus on the case country’s weak points. In other words, to increase constraints, reduce resources or both in the different areas mentioned in the IPI. The indicators can be used to map and monitor change and progress.
**STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS**

**STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS**: Identify the corrupt system losers and winners as well as who are the system’s gatekeepers, brokers, patrons and clients, thus showing who has an interested in changing the status quo and in what areas, the change is more likely to happen. In other words, it is important to chart the position of actors in favor or against the reform.

To create the stakeholder map, we consider:

A. Actors’ influence, power within the system and role for the reform.

B. Actors’ interest to join the reform. This means broadly whether the actor gains or losses from the status quo and whether the possible future gains from reform are higher than the costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Interest in Reform</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>OPPOSITION</strong> (Winner of a corrupt regime, not interested or opposed to the CoC action). Their strength derives from their system gatekeeper position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>KEY PLAYERS (Critical allies within the CoC coalition).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td><strong>INDIFFERENT</strong> (not mobilized, not interested or informed). Their strength is in numbers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ALTRUIST</strong> (base of the coalition). Their strength is in numbers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TYPE OF ACTORS FOR THE COALITION:** Corruption does not produce only winners. While the winners are generally a narrow group of individuals, those who tend to lose from corruption are numerous and fragmented. For a successful anti-corruption action, it is important to situate, inform, unite and mobilize the losers.

**Key Players (high influence high interest):** stakeholders who stand to lose or gain significantly from change and whose actions affect the opposition’s ability to meet its objectives. The CoC project needs to ensure that their interests are fully represented in the coalition. The overall impact of the CoC project will require good relationships to be developed with these stakeholders.

**Altruists (low influence, high interest):** stakeholders who stand to lose from status quo and gain significantly from CoC and therefore are highly interested. But their actions cannot affect the opposition - they have low power. The CoC needs to ensure that they involved and adequately represented in the coalition. Their strength is in numbers.

**Indifferent (low influence, low interest):** Those stakeholders who do not stand to lose nor gain much from the CoC and whose actions cannot affect the CoC campaign’s ability to meet its objectives. These actors may require limited monitoring or informing or progress but are of low priority. They are unlikely to be the subject of CoC project activities or involved in project management.

**Opposition (high influence, low interest):** Those stakeholders whose actions can have a large impact on the CoC ability to meet its objectives, but who are not interested in changing the status quo. These actors are considered winners of the status quo or are being affected by it. As such, they have high incentives to maintain the status quo. These actors might be a source of risk and opposition to the CoC. CoC coalition will need to explore means to monitor and manage that risk. Limit their opposition or decrease their influence.

**The coalition** should include: Altruists and Key players and try to limit the influence of Opposites or get them to CoC side.

Finally, the last type of actor called **system gatekeepers or brokers:** Given their position within the political system or society, these actors have high influence but can be both in favor and against the reform. Institutional actors that have power over the reform, important for the success of anti-corruption effort because they can initiate the reform. On the other hand, they can also be the first obstacle within institutions. Examples of system gatekeepers are political parties but also important figures such as prosecutors and judges. Therefore, it is important to figure out whether the system gatekeepers situate in the upper left (opposition) or whether they are placed in the upper right quadrant (key players). Having these type of actors in opposition can make the reform process more difficult.
Role of International Organizations and Foreign Aid:

International donors can play multiple roles. IO and donors primarily act as providers of extra resources (providing funding for schools, etc.). Unfortunately, they frequently increase the level of rents for corruption and unaccountable money flows. Their attention to governance framework and (normative and legal) constraints are limited. However, increasingly we see interest in providing international norms and normative framework for aid reform, such as UNCAC. However, so far enforcement has been limited. Nonetheless, IO’s are increasing their regulatory role: FPCE, OECD, money laundering provisions, asset recovery, etc.

The international community should focus on building accountability and collective action in the communities. International pressure can help to adopt some reforms that can be then used by the local coalitions to empower themselves. For example, FOIA acts or open government and data disclosures. In other words, IO should have focus on providing resources for reforms but also increase resources for establishing effective constraints.
Policy analysis means to identify the options for intervention, whether it be a principal-agent type action (corruption is the exception) or applying a collective action solution (institutional corruption).

1. The first step is to define the problem as a policy problem.

2. Norm diagnosis: whether we are in scenario A (corruption as a norm) or Scenario B (corruption as an exception).

3. Anti-corruption/ control of corruption as an equilibrium between resources and constraints. (in two different scenarios).

4. Stakeholder analysis (critical mass).

» Definition of the problem as a policy problem

Problem definition is important. It is the first move in a policy process and thus the problem definition sets the debate, methods and predict the solution and actors that will be involved. The definition of the problem should be concrete, delimited and actionable. In other words, the problem should not be to limit corruption. But the researcher should be as concrete as possible, it is the weak point the resource system, administrative discretion or bribes in education. Then the definition of the problem to be solved is the lack of effective controls in natural resources extractions or high-power discretion of politicians.
» **Decide what do you will measure and then perform assessment and diagnostics:**

1. Corruption as waste / cost ineffectiveness - PET World Bank, Picci and Golden Italian cost or infrastructure.
2. Corruption as a deviation from impartiality/ethical universalism (government favoritism, state capture) — Fazekas.
3. Corruption as a fraudulent deviation from procedure (CRI, Fazekas and Toth).
4. Corruption as market distortion (World Bank, ERCAS).
5. Corruption as a prevalence of conflict of interest (TI-EU).
6. Corruption as a flawed political process, lack of access (US).
7. Corruption as integrity framework (PFE, Global Integrity, IPI).

» **Regime diagnosis:**

Depending on whether the country is in Situation A (corruption as an exception) or Scenario B (corruption as a norm), anti-corruption / control of corruption seeks to improve the equilibrium between resources and constraints in the two different scenarios.

### TABLE 6: SUMMARY TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Situation A CORRUPTION EXCEPTION</th>
<th>Situation B CORRUPTION NORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition:</strong></td>
<td>Sparse individual behavior where a public authority is abused in order to provide illicit private benefit</td>
<td>Social practice where particularism (not ethical universalism) informs most government transactions. Widespread favoritism and discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observable:</strong></td>
<td>Corruption unobservable</td>
<td>Corruption observable as overt behavior, as well as through outcomes/consequences. Need to: Monitor and limit impunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferred Observation Level:</strong></td>
<td>Micro + qualitative: e.g. lobby studies</td>
<td>Macro and quantitative: how many bills are driven by special interests, how many contracts awarded without competitive process, how many officials engaging in corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
» **Control of Corruption in Situation A**

**Corruption is the exception: Principal-agent framework**

In this scenario, corruption is concentrated in one policy area (finance, hiring, health, education, licensing) or to a level of government and administration (national, local, regional or public officials and servants — petty corruption). In these cases, the judicial power and the rule of law function are predictable.

**PROBLEM:** In the Principal Agent framework, the Agent’s shirking is caused by his/her discretionary powers to implement policies, dispose of the budget and perform controls. Agent advantages are access and control over information and expert knowledge. The Principal fails to control the Agent because of the lack of suitable and effective instruments, low punishment and information asymmetry.

**POLICIES:** Focus on the institutional framework. Empower the principal by increasing constraints and oversight of the principal over the Agent, as well as by reducing the Agent’s discretionary power

- Increase flow of information (Transparency, open government and data disclosure),
- Increase the accountability (control mechanisms, reporting, whistleblowing rules and protection),
- Increase the deterrence (punishment, fines and legal action)
- Reduce the discretionary power of the agent. In the latter case, technology can be especially useful, taking some or the discretion of agent away.

» **Control of Corruption in Situation B**

**Corruption is the norm: CoC within collective action framework (individuals have meagre incentives to change or act on the corruption).**

The institutional framework is weak and/or in competition with informal rules. Laws are enforced selectively. Existence of several factions in the state and the judiciary is weak and politicized. In this case, the control of corruption strategy resembles a state-building exercise. This means that action is required on both the state and society levels. Deterrence alone will not work. Control of corruption in this scenario will be a collective action exercise.
The strongest formal constraints are functioning and independent tribunals. The politicians, especially the corrupt ones, are very aware of this. That is why it is exceptionally difficult to build independent judiciary without external pressure. It is also the reason why the judiciary together with the press are the first targets of corrupt politicians when they acquire power. Moreover, a free and independent press is the crucial watchdog that constrains the arbitrary exercise of power and its abuse. Civil society, especially one that is formally organized, is an additional constraint on power. By contrast, large-scale mobilizations and protests can build momentum and ‘scare’ those in power. But it is structured and organized civil society action that gives continuity to popular checks on power.

**CORRUPTION FORMULA:**

\[ C = M + D - A \]

*Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability*

**POLICIES:** Based on collective action theories, a successful effort to build collective action to protect common goods (good governance can be understood as a common good), a community should among other things ensure that the anti-corruption coalition is clearly defined (clear group boundaries) and includes people affected by corruption. Furthermore, those affected by corruption should be able to participate in modifying the rules in order for the new policies to provide meaningful results for them as well as for coalition members. Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ behavior. Use gradual sanctions for rule violators (IPI constraints) and seek to provide accessible, low cost and independent means for rule enforcement and dispute resolutions (independent judiciary but also access to information like transparency and tools for control). Finally, the system should be organized in nested tiers from the lowest levels up to the entire interconnected system (which includes international organizations).

» **Stakeholder analysis and building of critical mass**

- Analyze and map all relevant stakeholders (interest and influence), define their power and interest in the status quo. Identify the key players, the opposition (system’s winners), and those that will be the core of your coalition. Find the gate keepers and see whether these can be part of your coalition.
• Understand actors’ motivations and interests to participate in control of corruption and reform. Can they be the base for a stable and goal-oriented coalition? Sometimes your allies are self-interested, but the interests might overlap. For example, professional or business associations that are interested in limiting petty corruption and administrative bribes that limit their profits can be valuable agents of change. Many of those allies are to be found outside of governments.

• Determine what can be the role of international organizations and donors.

• A control of corruption coalition must both defend the interests of losers and monitor good governance (altruists).

• Never rely only on one person or type of actors. Build wide enough coalitions. CoC must be conceived as a broad social accountability approach to every public resource allocation activity. It is a poor design to have only a handful of dedicated anti-corruption organizations, as they can be easily isolated and made a target.

• The critical mass for reform should be as strong as the power that restrains the reform and change of the regime. The administration generally succumbs to the existing power relationships within the state, and they will change their loyalty and behavior only when an opposing power reaches certain strength.

• Provide tools to empower and rally the public: An active citizen with a mobile phone can watch and report irregularities or corruption.

• The CoC campaign needs to ensure free access to Internet and access to public data like the publication of government expenses (online expense tracking systems), procurement (e-procurement), available public jobs, etc.

• The people and organizations engaged in direct CoC activity (whistleblowing, disclosure campaigns) need to be protected and shielded from political harassment.
## ANTI-CORRUPTION GLOSSARY

Original source and more information:
Transparency International website
(www.transparency.org/glossary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bribery</strong></td>
<td>The offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust. Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other advantages (taxes, services, donations, favors, etc.). Also, facilitation payment - ‘payment’ to facilitating, ‘speed’ administrative action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clientelism</strong></td>
<td>An unequal system of exchanging resources and favors based on an exploitative relationship between a wealthier and/or more powerful patron and a less wealthy and weaker client.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nepotism</strong></td>
<td>Form of favoritism based on acquaintances and familiar relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or favor to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collusion</strong></td>
<td>A secret agreement between parties, in the public and/or private sector, to conspire to commit actions aimed to deceive or commit fraud with the objective of illicit financial gain. The parties involved often are referred to as cartels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal Gratuity</strong></td>
<td>Giving or receiving something of value after a transaction is completed, in acknowledgement of some influence over the transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict of Interest</strong></td>
<td>Situation where an individual or the entity for which they work, whether a government, business, media outlet or civil society organization, is confronted with choosing between the duties and demands of their position and their private interests in a transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Embezzlement</strong></td>
<td>When a person holding office in an institution, organization or company dishonestly and illegally appropriates, uses or traffics the funds and goods they have been entrusted with for personal enrichment or other activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extortion</strong></td>
<td>Demanding a sum of money (or goods) with a threat of harm (physical or business) if demands are not met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAUD</strong></td>
<td>To cheat. The offence of intentionally deceiving someone to gain an unfair or illegal advantage (financial, political or otherwise). Countries consider such offences to be criminal or a violation of civil law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MONEY LAUNDERING</strong></td>
<td>Money Laundering is the process of concealing the origin, ownership or destination of illegally or dishonestly obtained money by hiding it within legitimate economic activities to make them appear legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND CORRUPTION</strong></td>
<td>The abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society. It often goes unpunished. See also ‘corruption’, ‘petty corruption’, and political corruption’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KICKBACK</strong></td>
<td>A portion of the value of the contract demanded as a bribe by an official for securing the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE CAPTURE</strong></td>
<td>A situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to influence a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their private interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVOLVING DOOR</strong></td>
<td>The term ‘revolving door’ refers to the movement of individuals between positions of public office and jobs in the same sector in the private or voluntary sector, in either direction. If not properly regulated, it can be open to abuse. A cooling-off period is a minimum time required between switching from the public to the private sector intended to discourage the practice and minimize its impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRONY CAPITALISM</strong></td>
<td>Crony capitalism is associated with market distortion due to connection to political power. Under crony capitalism selected economic elites receive preferential treatment and privileges, thus making support from the state rather than market forces a crucial factor for maintaining and accruing wealth. Crony means a friend, a pal, or a buddy, and cronyism originally meant friendship. Cronyism eventually acquired a negative connotation in general discourse as a description or the phenomenon of the exercising of authority in a manner that favors friends or associates at the expense of merit. Crony capitalism is a term describing an economy in which success in business depends on close relationships between businesspeople and government officials. It may be exhibited by favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, or other forms of state interventionism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE CAPTURE</strong></td>
<td>A situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to influence a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their private interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• World governance indicators (check the methodology and definitions before you start using different components):
  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports

• Transparency International has a wide array of indicators: CPI, Bribe payers’ index, Global Corruption Barometer:
  http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/
  https://www.transparency.org/research/bpi/
  http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/

• Euro barometer (check the specials on corruption): http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/1076

• Enterprise survey (before BEEPS) asks the business about corruption:
  https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/

• Global Competitiveness Report data by World Economic Forum has info on corruption as well as judicial independence and competitiveness

• Global Integrity database (very important):
  https://www.globalintegrity.org/globalyear/2013/

• Several data sources will help you in defining the context for your country studies. Some of them also ask questions about corruption: On the one side, there’s the Human Development Report data:
  http://hdr.undp.org
Then there are several surveys that capture citizens opinions that are relevant and ask about corruption:

**WORLD VALUE SURVEY:**
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

**EUROBAROMETER:**
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/

**AFRO BAROMETER:**
http://www.afrobarometer.org/

**ASIAN BAROMETER:**
https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/data

**AMERICAS BAROMETER (LAPOP):**
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/

A lot of data is also provided by the Quality of Government Institute at Gothenburg University, one of our project partners. They have several surveys and reports that might be interesting for you. They have data on a regional level, expert survey on public service, time series and good data for Russia. Check also their data visualization tool (graphs) and a very comprehensive download section.

http://qog.pol.gu.se/data

And the IPI created by the ERCAS and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (many of the indicators are objective). Detailed methodology and sources are provided as well as it is possible to desegregate different components.

http://integrity-index.org/

For the objective indicators, you can check:

**DOING BUSINESS (DATA ON THE REGULATORY BURDEN OF FIRMS AND COSTS OF STARTING COMPANY)**
http://www.doingbusiness.org/

**OPEN BUDGET SURVEY**
CRONY CAPITALISM:

Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/Aversion:static
The Economist’s crony capitalism index (only interactive table)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-2

Wealth X (website similar to The Economist)
http://www.billionairecensus.com/

- Data on quality and performance of democracy:

“Freedom Houses publishes its Freedom of the World and Freedom of the Press reports for many years. They also recently added a Freedom on the Net report. Their Nations in Transit (NiT) project is a very good source on Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia:

https://freedomhouse.org/reports

The Polity IV dataset is also well respected amongst academics as a reliable source on political systems:

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is a newer project, but has received a lot of praise for their work:

https://www.v-dem.net/en/

The Democracy Barometer is also a recent Swiss-German project and partially supervised by Prof. Wolfgang Merkel, who also used to teach at the Hertie School:

http://www.democracybarometer.mg/index.html