If you haven’t had a chance yet, check out Foreign Policy’s failed states index.
Particularly interesting is the link between corruption and instability:
This year’s index shows a strong correlation between Transparency International’s perception of corruption scores and a state’s instability. Eight of the 10 most stable countries also appear among the 10 least corrupt. Chile–widely recognized as the least corrupt country in Latin America–is also the most stable in the region. Paraguay, which has a large “gray” economy, is one of the few countries with a terrible corruption score that’s not on the brink of collapse.
An interesting argument is made towards the end of the piece. There are quite a few instances of stable countries bordering the unstable ones, but, as the authors say, isolation rarely works. Thus
Often, the more stable neighbor tries to prop up the failing state in hopes that time will heal it. South Africa’s government, for example, has tried to shelter Mugabe’s regime from international sanctions, perhaps fearful that firmer measures would push the state over the edge. Similarly, Seoul has resisted U.S. pressure for a tougher stance against Pyongyang as it pursues nuclear weapons.
If ignoring the failing neighbor is not an option and neither is the complete overhaul of the system that sustains the failing state, then what is the right strategy? We may be on to an argument for gradual development of governance mechanisms, which allow for a transition to a more stable market and an effective political systems, which bring with them the ability to address the needs and concerns of their participants. Certainly, international support for grassroots programs has a role to play, especially in countries like Zimbabwe, and such programs can be a viable alternative to sanctions. However, on the other end, we have governments which seek to curb the growth of civil society and block efforts from the outside that support good governance initiatives.
Aid tied to governance could be one of the solutions, and, as I argue in my recent post, the incentive of attracting investment can be another — more effective — one to generate the kind of local-led reforms that improve democratic and economic performance. Such strategies, however, are applicable to a certain list of countries, but what do you do with places like North Korea and Belarus where there seems to be a total indifference about reduced aid, no investment, etc.? If country leaders are willing to lock themselves out of the global system and significantly limit the ability of grassroots civil society organizations to function, what kind of incentives can you offer to promote change?
Published Date: July 17, 2006