Tag Archives: Think Tank LINKS

Enhancing Youth’s Political Participation in Pakistan


By Fayyaz Bhidal, Research Manager at Sustainable Development Policy Institute

Internationally, the average age of eligibility for election to national parliament starts at 25 years old. According to a UNDP 2012 Global Parliamentary Report, approximately 1.65 percent of parliamentarians globally are in their 20s, while 11.87 percent are in their 30s. However, the global average age of parliamentarians is 53 years old.

In Pakistan, youth represent 60 percent of the total population, but their voice is largely unrepresented in the political system. The youth population is not only a dynamic source of innovation and creativity, but has contributed to and even catalyzed important changes in political systems, power-sharing dynamics, and economic opportunities since Pakistan was created. One leading force for these changes is the Youth Parliament of Pakistan which was created in 2007 to engage youth in dialogue on important issues affecting Pakistan. Within local government, youth are also taking an active role in achieving implementation of work. In the recently held local government polls of Khyber Pakhtunkwa Province of Pakistan, 3,339 seats were devoted for the youth.

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The New Middle East: An Uncertain Future

Map of Middle East Region

By Bahaa Eddin Al Dahoudi, CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow

What future awaits the Middle East? This question remains pivotal following the outbreak of the Arab revolutions four years ago. It keeps popping up as regional developments arise, especially with the decline of democracy and presence of revolutionary forces in many Arab countries. The region’s resort to military tools is increasing due to the rise of terrorism, violence, and political polarization, a decline of charismatic leaders, and a lack of support for institutional structures and democratic transitions. In a Middle East where “there is no winner,” two vital questions emerge: Is the Arab revolution the reason behind the chaos and collapses? And, what are the future scenarios for this inflamed region?

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Maximum Wage in Egypt: Who Pays the Bill?


Photo: Muhammad Mansour

Hiba Safi is a CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.

This post originally appeared on the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy blog

Over the course of the past several months, a revolt has taken place in Egypt’s banking sector. Seeking better opportunities and higher salaries in private sector banking jobs, hundreds of banking officials have resigned in protest since July 2014 legislation placed a cap on salaries for employees in Egypt’s public sector. While most public servants had little cause for concern, the law also applies to those working in state-owned companies. Suddenly executives at Egypt’s many state-owned banks would earn a maximum monthly wage of 42,000 Egyptian pounds (roughly US$6,000)—a mere fraction of their earning potential.

Former Minister of Finance Samir Radwan has spoken out against the implementation of a maximum wage, stressing that such an approach deprives public servants of their rights and does not meet demands for social justice. On February 17, a Cairo administrative court sided with workers from the Housing and Development Bank and the Export Development Bank of Egypt, ruling the maximum wage law to be unconstitutional. Tasked with fulfilling revolutionary calls for social justice and repairing an Egyptian economy on the ropes since the January 2011 uprising, President Abdel-Fattah El Sisi’s decision to cap a maximum wage at “no more than the president earns” aims to promote equality and social justice, halt the growth of income inequality, and bolster the middle class. But the actual impact of a maximum wage merits more consideration: Should there be a maximum wage in Egypt? Would the economy really be better off after capping earnings, particularly given the landscape of public and private ownership of many key sectors in the Egyptian economy?

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Libya or Tunisia: Who Needs the Other More?

March2015 Hiba

Hiba Safi is a CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy

Diplomatic Ties

The Libyan conflict is not only causing tens of thousands of deaths, destroying a society, and wiping out a state. It also is spilling over into neighboring Tunisia, destabilizing its internal equilibrium, redefining cross-border interactions, and affecting all neighboring countries in the Maghreb.

Since the uprising against President Muammar Qaddafi in March 2011, Tunisia has seen a vast influx of Libyan refugees. Cars, decrepit vans, and trucks packed with families sitting among bundles of belongings, suitcases, and mattresses stream into Ras Jedir and Dhehiba – official border crossings in southern Tunisia.

According to the former Tunisian Minister of Commerce, the country hosts around 1 million Libyans—equal to nearly 10 percent of the Tunisian population. Libya’s crisis and the ongoing entry of Libyan refugees into the country has resulted in unprecedented social, economic, and security challenges to Tunisia. Despite these difficulties, Tunisia has thus far maintained an open border policy toward Libyans and Libya’s Egyptians seeking respite from the violence in Libya—a decision that’s been praised by UN officials and Western diplomats.

No effective regulatory framework defines the relationship between the two countries, “They don’t need [a] visa to enter Tunisia nor any particular authorization to reside [in Tunisia],”stated Tunisian Interior Ministry spokesman Mohamed Ali Aroui.

Tunisia bears the brunt of the economic and social spillovers of the Libyan civil war. The 43-mile border (Ras Jedir in Libya and Ben Guerdane in Tunisia) has become a smuggling route for goods, oil, and arms, but also for anti-regime armed groups and terrorists. Moreover, the conflict next door has exacerbated inter-communal conflicts raging within Tunisia domestically.

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China and Pakistan’s All-Weather Friendship


Huma Sattar is a CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. This post originally appeared at The Diplomat.

Much to the befuddlement of the rest of the world – and as ironic as it is – Communist China and Islamic Pakistan are fast friends. It’s all hail to China in Pakistan and as other partnerships wither and die, these two countries continue to devote energy to strengthening their relationship. China has historically come to Pakistan’s rescue with economic, political, military and nuclear assistance and perhaps what was once a relationship founded on a mutual disillusionment with India has moved toward one with more aspirational intentions on both sides.

It would appear that Pakistan has been the greater beneficiary of this friendship – from military to economic assistance, China has stood by Pakistan, but is the friendship really that sustainable? Andrew Small from the German Marshall Fund certainly seems to think so. An Asia expert, Small recently published a book examining what he calls the unusual nature of the secretive relationship between China and Pakistan and argues that it is much more promising than Pakistan’s erratic ties with the U.S. And indeed, history supports this. On a visit to Pakistan earlier this year, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi assured Islamabad that China and Pakistan were in sync on all matters and have an “iron-clad” understanding between them, one that has taken years to hone and fortify.

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The Gaza Strip Today: The Challenges and Potential

Bahaa Eddin Al-Dahoudi is a CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow at Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).


Besides experiencing three destructive wars in less than ten years – Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Protective Edge – the Gaza Strip has suffered since 2007 from two unprecedented major political events that affect both the lives and future aspirations of the Palestinians: the Israeli blockade and internal division.

The Gaza Strip, now in its seventh year under Israeli blockade, remains isolated from the outside world. The blockade affects many fields including education, business, the environment, technology, and culture. What is more, there is the internal Palestinian division which has further exacerbated the situation. The political and social division among the two largest Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, has led to declines in many areas.

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Pakistan and India: Irreconcilable or Just Stubborn?


Trucks wait at the India-Pakistan border. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Huma Sattar is a CIPE-Atlas Corps Think Tank LINKS Fellow at the Heritage Foundation

Pakistan and India share a long, unyielding history. The past is marred with political and territorial conflict, militarization, and a general sense of mistrust on both sides.

Since 2003, trade between the two countries has grown seven-fold, with Indian imports into Pakistan taking 80 percent of the share, according to data reported by International Trade Centre. While formal figures report bilateral trade of U.S $2.3 billion for 2013, some estimates contend that a larger share of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India comes through indirect or informal routes. Trade is estimated to be double what statistics report with significant Indian imports coming through Dubai into Pakistan.

Many studies which have aimed to estimate potential bilateral trade between Pakistan and India have concluded consistently that there are enormous economic synergies that can exist between the two economies given their trade complementarity and geographic proximity. Mutually preferential cooperation would benefit both Pakistan and India.

However, Pakistan has still not granted Most Favored Nation status (MFN) to India despite talks that seemed to have made progress in the past few years. Judging by the recent statements made by officials from Pakistan, it seems the country will remain flummoxed by the idea of granting MFN to India, contending one or more of the following as reason for their reservations:

  • India gave MFN to Pakistan in 1996. For Pakistan, however, the trade deficit has only increased.
  • MFN to India will hurt the local economy of Pakistan.
  • Increasing trade with India has hardened India’s stance on Kashmir.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, the merits of these arguments are wearing thin. In fact, putting the Kashmir issue and trade on the same table ensures that neither side relents and both issues remain unaddressed. 

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