Tag Archives: egypt

The other transition

Posted on 25 June, 2012 by | Comments Off

Egyptians in Tahrir Square during the presidential election (Andre Pain/European Pressphoto Agency)

The turmoil engulfing Egypt’s presidential election has been a stark reminder of the difficulties the Arab Spring countries face with challenging political transitions. In countries where democracy has little precedent and where popular will was long suppressed, the new political opening has brought much anticipated civil liberties but also juxtaposed competing forces and diverging interests. Yet, among all the attention that headlines give to the political process, the story of another equally crucial transition – economic one – is often lost.

It is important to keep in mind that the roots of MENA revolts were both political and economic in nature, including demographic pressures, inefficient public sector, and constrained private sector. In other words, the lack of political freedoms was compounded by the profound lack of economic freedoms. That in turn fueled unsustainable levels of government employment and swelled the ranks of young people like Tunisia’s Mohammed Bouazizi who, without other viable options, strive to earn a meager living in the informal sector. A year and a half after Tunisia ousted its long-time authoritarian ruler, political transformation is underway but the economy struggles.

Many Tunisians who rose in protest against Ben Ali are disappointed with slow progress of reforms. Protestor Beshar Messaoud recently interviewed by NPR says that, economically speaking, things are exactly the same and the government has brought no solutions to the problems that led to the revolution in the first place. Unemployment is officially at 18 percent but it may actually be twice as high. Another interviewee, 35-year-old Laila Turki adds that if Tunisia doesn’t get its act together and improve its economy quickly, it will undermine its chances to build a functioning democracy.

But there are many misconceptions about what is needed for the economy to improve. For one, demands for economic change often focus on populist calls for more entitlements with little consideration given to how a sound economy capable of delivering sustained prosperity to its citizens can be built. What is more, the very understanding of what a true market economy entails has been tainted by decades of crony capitalism in the region. As a recent post on the Institute of Economic Affairs’ (IEA) blog points out, the meaning of “pro-business” in MENA has been warped: the “pro-business” policies of authoritarian leaders were limited to only one type of businesses – the ones connected to the government. That’s not the same as being pro-market, which requires allowing economic freedom for all segments of the society and building institutions that enable competition on a level playing field.

Instead, MENA ruling elites built systems that monopolized economic rents and jealously guarded their own economic privileges. That, in turn, necessitated the suppression of not just freedom of political expression but economic freedom as well. The legacy of that system is clearly visible in Egypt today. During the rule of post-independence leaders Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak – all military men – the military has amassed a huge business empire in sectors from agriculture to electronics. Current estimates show that military-connected enterprises account for 10 to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy; meanwhile, more than 40 percent of Egyptians continue to live on $2 a day or less. Therefore, the real question of Egypt’s political transition is whether the formal return to civilian rule will translate into meaningful boost to pluralism on the economic front (pun intended).

The same goes for transitions in other MENA countries as well. Their success will depend on the degree to which the economic undercurrents of political turmoil are better understood and more effectively addressed, and the degree to which the misconceptions about the nature of market-oriented reforms are overcome. As the IEA blog emphasizes, a deeper reflection on the central place of the entrepreneur in economic development is needed, since “the future of the Arab Spring depends on the capacity of the new democratically elected governments to implement measures to prevent crony capitalism, restore the rule of law and promote economic freedom, in order to ensure general prosperity.”

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The Youth Struggle to Participate in Egypt’s Transition

Posted on 19 April, 2012 by | 2 Comments

Seif El Khawanky was a youth activist in Tahrir Square during the revolution.

Watch a video of Seif discussing the motivations of the youth revolution and Egypt’s future.

Nearly 14 months after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has reached a point of reckoning. Over the next few months, Egyptians are scheduled to write and adopt a constitution and elect their first post-revolutionary president. These Herculean undertakings will only be as successful as the consensus that backs them, and yet Egyptian society shows a troubling degree of polarization.

Among those who express frustration with their country’s post-revolutionary transition are the youth activists who sparked it. Egypt’s youth unquestionably played a leading role in organizing their countrymen and outmaneuvering the leaders who had long failed to provide opportunities to participate politically and economically. Yet, youth have complained that they have been sidelined from the post-revolutionary transition.

Speaking at a recent CIPE brownbag lunch about the role of youth in Egypt’s transition and their difficulty securing a role in it, CIPE Junior Program Officer and Egyptian youth activist Seif El Khawanky used an analogy that for me brought back some painful memories.

According to Khawanky, the Egyptian political scene currently comprises a series of informal checks and balances between the Egyptian Parliament; the interim government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); and the Egyptian Street, a group that includes the youth activists who drove Egypt’s revolution. According to Khawanky, the hierarchical nature of organizations like the SCAF, Muslim Brotherhood, and political parties has simultaneously made it easier for them to negotiate with each other and harder to conduct dialogue with youth who have eschewed hierarchical organization.

“We are playing soccer. They are playing basketball. So, we cannot go to the same playground,” Khawanky said. Unfortunately, the time I spent living in Cairo taught me just how painful it can be when these two games intersect.

In a soccer-crazed city that offers approximately a footprint of green space per person, basketball courts can be hard to find. Among the few refuges to play basketball was a strip of dusty tiles under the 6th of October Bridge. With two ends of the strip featuring basketball hoops and the other two featuring soccer goals, however, the space was contested. It became commonplace to find myself in an argument about which game should take precedence.

The most common resolution to that argument was that while far from ideal, the two could take place simultaneously. Unfortunately for the soccer players, my Derrick Rose-like drives to the basket would sometimes serve as an obstruction to the path of their ball. And unfortunately for my face, soccer balls don’t avoid obstructions; they smash into them.

Egypt’s transition has often resembled this confused situation, and the results have at times been far more painful than a soccer ball to the face. In playing basketball, as Khawanky put it, Egypt’s generals and political leaders have largely organized themselves into hierarchical organizations with clear leaders. They have scored baskets by securing widespread compliance or support for their political roles. In playing soccer, Egypt’s youth activists have organized themselves in a more amorphous fashion. They have scored goals largely by exposing injustices or building pressure for change.

The two games have often intersected and impacted each other. As Egyptian activists have realized that both the military and some political parties enjoy some level of popular support, they have broadened their tactics from mass gatherings in Tahrir Square. Likewise, as the generals and politicians have realized the potential of youth to mobilize around a goal, they have often had to change the composition of the government or the timeline of their transition plan. Khawanky pointed out that in the past month protests successfully pressured the government to try police officers who bore some responsibility for the deadly clashes earlier this year in Port Said.

Many youth have tried to carve out a role in the game played by the generals and politicians, volunteering their time and energy to the many campaigns for the politicians who might be able to change the system from within. Street activism, however, continues to be perceived by many as the most effective means of forcing change, at least in accomplishing limited goals. Yet, it comes with a cost. To Egyptians tired of the destabilizing effect of their revolution on their daily lives, continued protests, despite their effectiveness, have reinforced the misperception, according to Khawanky, that youth are “irresponsible, intolerant, inexperienced, and radical,” furthering their marginalization.

This state of affairs, in which Egyptian policymakers exclude youth from the policymaking process but expect them to swallow their frustration like they did before the revolution, is a recipe for continued crisis. In a country that badly needs a modicum of stability, Egyptian policymakers need to find a way to capitalize on the energy and ideas of this generation of revolutionary youth.

Egyptian youth can help themselves, however, as well. According to Khawanky, part of the reason for the marginalization of youth has been their failure to present a clear vision and the fact that their idealism has made it hard to compromise. A movement that so ingeniously organized itself into a leaderless movement united in purpose during the uprising has struggled to organize itself to maximize its impact following Mubarak’s fall.

By building organizations such as NGOs, think tanks, newspapers, and magazines capable of not only highlighting problems but also positing solutions that adhere both to the principles of their revolution and to the challenges Egyptians face, youth activists might find that not only can they play the generals’ and politicians’ game, but they can win it. And they can do so while building the trust of their countrymen. This will not be easy in the difficult political environment in which Egypt is mired. Yet, Egyptian youth have proven that it is a mistake to underestimate their potential.

In the meantime, while it’s possible to play basketball and soccer simultaneously on the same court, it can make for a painful game.

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Egypt’s Food Subsidies and the IMF

Posted on 3 April, 2012 by | 2 Comments

Egyptians wait to buy subsidized bread. (Photo: Reuters)

This week, the IMF is back in Egypt to meet with government leaders to discuss a proposed $3.2 billion loan to the country’s transitional government. So far, the package has yet to garner support from either the Muslim Brotherhood or leading Salafist party Al-Nour, both of whom are waiting to hear more details about the economic measures related to the package.

One of the reforms being considered is an end to the billion-dollar food subsidy program, an issue that the has historically proved contentious in Egypt. However, with the right reforms, the Egyptian Government may finally be able to improve an unsustainable program without causing civil unrest or creating uncertainty that would drive away the outside investment the country so desperately needs.

The Egyptian government has long been dependent on food subsidies to shore up popular support. In 1977, President Sadat tried unsuccessfully to end subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil, which brought hundreds of thousands of people into the streets to protest. In 2008, people again took to the streets in Cairo, as in other cities around the world, to protest the skyrocketing price of food. In response, the Egyptian government increased its food subsidies. Egypt is now the world’s largest buyer of wheat on international markets.

Today, according to a recent Wall Street Journal article, subsidies absorb at least 28% of Egypt’s state budget, and when combined with fuel subsidies account for over 10% of GDP. This increase in food subsidies is the result of a number of structural problems stemming from the weakness of the private sector. As Egypt’s new governing institutions develop, space needs to be created for the private sector to grow and play a role in providing feedback on any economic reforms made by the government.

According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index, Egypt ranks 106th globally in its quality of trade and transport related infrastructure. Weak port infrastructure and a lack of cool storage facilities at ports increase the cost of staple goods such as rice and grain, which factor into the cost of food subsidies.

A second problem, which is endemic across the region, is a highly segmented and regulated regional trade network. Barriers to trade and other complicated trade logistics, which vary on a country-to-country basis increase transaction costs, which add to the value of important staple goods. According to a research paper by Oxford University, The Economics of the Arab Spring, “a better infrastructure, by connecting the region’s agricultural markets, can mitigate fluctuations in food prices, since transport costs can make up as much as 40 percent of the overall food price in the region.”

Removing barriers to trade, modernizing infrastructure, and developing regional trade networks are much needed reforms that the Egyptian government and newly elected parliament should quickly embrace, especially in labor-intensive industries such as in agriculture. Recently, the Turkish government has stated their intention to pump over $1 billion into Egyptian investment projects in the next few years. Egypt’s Minister of Industry and Trade has recently disclosed plans for a shipping route between the port of Alexandria and Mersin on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Investments related to ports and other trade-related infrastructure must be coupled with any IMF-mandated economic reforms.

As we have seen in the past few months, there is a global interest in seeing that the IMF loan is signed, and these much needed reforms are made to an increasingly unstable food subsidy system. The EU, African Union, and multinational companies from all around the world have expressed interest in making investments into Egypt. However, most of these outside investments are contingent upon the Egyptian government signing the IMF loan. By making structural reforms to solve problems stemming from a weak private sector, and making investments in infrastructure and other trade-related industries, the government may be able to reform the food subsidy system, and put itself back on a path of short-term budget sustainability and long-term economic growth without losing the backing of the Egyptian people.

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Egypt, One Year Later

Posted on 25 January, 2012 by | Comments Off

Sunset prayers in Tahrir Square, January 25, 2012. (Photo: CIPE Staff)

One year ago today, millions of Egyptians risked their lives to make their country a better place in which to live. Unlike in Tunisia, where the degree of consensus on how the country should be governed has been remarkable, the year that has followed the Egyptian uprising has been contentious and pocked by crises, in some ways making elusive that better life that Egyptians seek. By agreeing that delivering a better life to the average person should be the top priority, however, Egyptians may find ground for consensus that could make their transition smoother.

Thus far, the flourishing of political party formation and the largely free and fair elections that accompanied it have yet to deliver better lives to the average Egyptian, as an economy that was hardly robust to begin with struggled to heal from the dislocation of revolution. The continued struggles to find consensus regarding the country’s direction have exacerbated this dislocation by creating instability. Uncertainty and crises have made Egyptians and foreigners alike skittish about spending their money in Egypt.

Rather than delivering a better life to the average Egyptian, the revolution has thus far made daily life trickier. Jobs are evaporating, food is becoming more expensive, and fuel is becoming scarce. According to an article posted yesterday by The New York Times, many Egyptians can no longer afford to get married. In a recent Reuters article titled “Uprising leaves Egyptians freer, poorer,” Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq, the 48-year-old owner of a ceramics workshop summed up the frustration that many feel: “People are getting laid off, sitting around with nothing to do. A revolution should make life easier. It should rebuild. Ever since the revolution happened, I can’t get my loaf of bread.”

The success of Egypt’s revolution may depend on the ability of Egyptian political and civil society leaders to not only restore confidence in the country’s economy, but to reform it so that it delivers more robustly for average Egyptians. Recently, Egyptian political parties have been moving towards a consensus response to economic challenges that would entail securing loans from the IMF and other donors, strengthening financial markets, investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises, and trimming the budget deficit, potentially by cutting subsidies, which Ahmed Heikal of Citadel Capital recently wrote would free up $58 billion a year for the government to invest in other areas that need it. If Egyptians can come to consensus on these issues, it could infuse confidence in their transition and make future challenges less imposing.

For their part, many Egyptians project confidence in their ability to come together and handle the challenges that confront their country one year into their revolution. Dalia Mogahed, director and senior analyst at the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, recently wrote that according to Gallup polls conducted throughout the year, the “real revolution” is that “Egyptians are more optimistic than they have been in years.”

Mohamed El-Erian, who as the CEO of the investment fund PIMCO, probably has a decent grasp of the magnitude of the challenges to Egypt’s economy, recently wrote confidently of Egypt’s prospects. Referring to the country’s economic challenges as “headwinds that can and will be overcome,” El-Erian wrote that “Egyptians are committed to completing their impressive revolution, and they will.”

Egyptians came together on January 25, 2011, and the 18 days that followed it, showing a resolve and unity of purpose that continues to provide confidence to Egyptians today. Rediscovering that unity of purpose to focus on the problems confronting the average Egyptian could serve to bring Egyptians together again, making the challenges of building a workable democracy a little less challenging.

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Beyond Elections: The Need for an Economic Vision for Egypt

Posted on 29 November, 2011 by | Comments Off
Egyptians vote

Record numbers of Egyptians turned out yesterday and today for the country's first democratic elections in decades. (Photo: CIPE Staff)

When Egyptians headed to the polls yesterday to begin the process of electing a parliament, the transition of their country to democracy remained uncertain. Political instability, which has dampened investment, consumer confidence, and tourism, has made many Egyptians wary of what the future may hold for them.

Last week, Egypt’s stock market dipped to its lowest point in over two and a half years. Egypt’s foreign reserves had already dwindled, potentially heralding an impending financial crisis. The Egyptian pound had depreciated, making many goods more expensive for Egyptians. Fearful of an uncertain future, Egyptian consumers have cut down on their spending. Tourists, who were once so ubiquitous in Cairo, Luxor, and Aswan, have been spooked by scenes of violence and have stayed away.

On Monday, Gallup released a poll showing that the number of Egyptians who believe that their conditions will improve as a result of the resignation of their former president has declined steadily. In September, a bare majority of Egyptians expressed confidence in the promise of their future. That number may be smaller today.

Despite the need for political and economic leadership and vision, the approach of Egyptian policymakers to the country’s economic problems has largely been reactive and piecemeal. They have raised salaries for public employees and made permanent previously temporary contracts for thousands of public officials. Pinning its economic hopes on alleviating corruption, the government has vigorously prosecuted thousands of cases of corruption alleged to have taken place during the previous administration. A coherent strategy for empowering the private sector to create the jobs needed to answer widespread calls for dignity has yet to emerge.

More troubling, the institutional channels through which diverse elements of Egypt’s political and civil society may participate in the conversation about the country’s future remain unformed. Ideally, the parliamentary elections which commenced yesterday would produce a representative body capable of building consensus among broad sectors of Egyptian society and using it to build policy.

Due to an extremely complex election law and the unrest that has formed a background to this round of voting, however, it is unclear whether these elections will produce a body capable of claiming popular legitimacy and wielding significant power. Even if a strong parliament emerges, three and a half important months will have passed before the three rounds of voting finish and the new parliament assumes power.

Outside the political arena, civil society should serve as another channel through which Egyptians can participate in their transition by generating ideas and holding their government accountable. Thus far, however, the ability of Egypt’s civil society to participate meaningfully in the transition has been limited. Feeling that more formal channels of communication offer them little power to shape the country’s future, many have returned to the streets.

An economic recovery in Egypt would not only provide a greater number of Egyptians an enhanced opportunity to achieve the dignity for which they have sacrificed so much, but would also infuse confidence in their nascent democracy. Yet the political and economic wariness that Egyptians are currently expressing will not merely disappear of its own accord. Rather, Egyptian leaders must articulate a political and economic vision for the country that appeals to Egyptian society in all its diversity.

Earlier this month, the Carnegie Endowment’s Ibrahim Saif wrote a paper laying out what Egypt’s leaders can do to stabilize the economy and ultimately create inclusive growth. While some of Egypt’s economic reforms will require the backing of a popularly elected government, Saif argued that moves aimed at stabilization should not wait.

In order to stabilize Egypt’s economy, Saif called on its interim leaders to:

  • establish security,
  • lay out a more clear economic and political roadmap,
  • work more closely with the full range of the private sector including small- and medium-sized enterprises,
  • adopt transparent and inclusive mechanisms for policymaking,
  • guarantee funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and
  • funnel the flow of foreign grants and loans into the construction of infrastructure and low-cost housing.

Egypt’s economy has reached a critical stage. Attracting foreign investment, restoring domestic consumer confidence, and rejuvenating the tourism industry cannot wait for the emergence of an elected parliament or president. Failure or inaction could undermine confidence in democracy.

A strong, broadly based Egyptian economy is fundamental to the country’s stability and lasting democratic governance. Yet the argument that Egypt needs its people to listen to its leaders, while the process remains exclusive, is a specious one. Widespread economic development coupled with democratic governance will create stability, not the other way around.

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Egypt’s economic procrastination

Posted on 25 November, 2011 by | 1 Comment

Unfinished apartment buildings in Cairo. (Photo: Flickr user qejecit)

We are facing an interesting dilemma in Egypt: although everyone realizes the importance of the economic dimension of the country’s transition and the quest for democracy, people tend to turn their backs when economic issues are brought up.

Last week I attended a political debate on reform in Egypt where economic questions were raised, but – intentionally or unintentionally – neglected by both the supporters of the SCAF and the revolutionaries. This is the reality of economic procrastination in Egypt: political powers on all sides are postponing the search for answers in meeting the country’s economic challenges.

Procrastination is part of the political blame game. On the one hand, SCAF is raising economic questions as part of its campaign for stability. On the other hand, the revolutionaries, represented in youth coalitions, emerging political parties, and media, accuse SCAF of being incompetent to lead the transition. The economic card is being played to gain political points rather than to find viable solutions.

Economic procrastination is in fact a major distortion to the democratic political transition in Egypt. Most in Egypt would agree that economic deterioration is one of the major reasons behind the anger that led to the revolution. The slogans during the 18 days of struggle, such as “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice,” tell the story.

The high poverty level in Egypt and unfair distribution of economic opportunity led to the injustice which fueled frustration against the old political system. Ironically, on the aggregate level, Egypt has enjoyed good economic growth rates in recent years. Nevertheless, the distribution of that wealth was the real problem – many of those at the bottom of the development ladder simply did not have access to the political system nor the benefits of macro-level economic growth.

In many ways, a lack of true democracy in Egypt can explain these trends. The economic orientation of the former political system encompassed the primacy of the economic sphere over the political sphere. This was represented in the corrupt relationship between some of the business groups and the dissolved National Democratic Party. Moreover, economic reform and compliance with the World Bank and IMF prescriptions without tailoring policies to local priorities and conditions lacked the necessary component of actual political reform. The wealth never trickled down, something which many assumed would automatically occur over time, but rather remained concentrated at the top of the pyramid, leading to frustration among the Egyptian masses.

There has been a lack of action to correct these problems following the revolution. Much of the focus has been on the political sphere, while economic issues, including creating economic opportunities for the Egyptian poor, remain ignored.

To understand the nature of economic problems facing Egypt, one can look at four major dimensions of the Egyptian economy:

  1. The hesitant rentier state: The Egyptian economy is highly dependent on revenues coming from rents, such revenues from the Suez Canal, gas and tourism industries, as well as significant foreign aid inflows. As rent revenues have decreased in recent years, the government has undertaken extensive tax reform, looking to tax financial institutions and transactions as a means of increasing its revenues.
  2. Absence of coherent economic platforms: Although there has been a tremendous growth in the number of political parties following the revolution – by latest estimates there are 50 political parties covering most of the political spectrum in Egypt – most if not all of those parties are not policy-oriented. Most of the parties are disconnected from their voters’ economic and social concerns and thus have little to offer in terms of practical policy solutions to current problems.
  3. Lack of business inclusion: The transitional government, or any government for that matter, cannot carry the burden of economic reform without engaging stakeholders who share the responsibility for economic development in the country. Unfortunately, business groups in Egypt, especially the majority of small and medium enterprises and the extensive informal sector, have not been integrated in the newly emerging political system in Egypt. Big businessmen are accused of being part of the former regime and carrying their own political agenda, and this view then extends to the entire private sector as a whole. SMEs and informal entrepreneurs have great policy recommendations that could represent a clear way out of the current economic crisis, but their voices often remain neglected.
  4. Government involvement in the economy: The military, directly and indirectly, controls a large portion of the Egyptian economy, which certainly reflects on its interference in the country’s economic policy. The exact numbers are unavailable due to the lack of transparency in the system. Such involvement, however, means that the military closely watches the state budget, leading to a more centralized system and negatively affecting demands for decentralization of power in the country. In seeking to preserve its economic power through political involvement, the military is also likely to be a strong voice against increasing calls for privatization.

Egyptians’ procrastination when it comes to addressing economic issues encompasses historical, cultural and social patterns. Despite widespread agreement on the importance of  economic issues during the transition period, disparities in power engender passive behavior towards such challenges. Sweeping current economic problems under the carpet in hopes that the new parliament will address them is not a viable strategy. If left unattended, these problems will only get worse. The time for action is now.

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Whither Democracy in Egypt?

Posted on 21 November, 2011 by | 1 Comment
Protestors stand off with police

Photo source: Asmaa Waguih/Reuters

Much has been written about the euphoria surrounding the ousting of Mubarak and the reality of making reforms work in the post-Mubarak era. The lesson that democracy is not built overnight is also frequently brought up.

The importance of institutions – not individuals – in shaping political and economic outcomes in Egypt, however, often escapes the headlines.

While many were fascinated with the trial of Mubarak (at one point televised live), in order to understand what’s really happening in the country one must look at the incentive structures that guide the behavior of decision-makers.

At a first glance, the recent news doesn’t quite make sense.  The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), according to some reports, has tried more than 12,000 civilians in less than a year since Mubarak stepped down. Mubarak, on the other hand, initiated only around 2,000 trials of his civilian political opposition in military courts…over the entire course of his three decades in power.

While officials cite the emergency law for bringing so many people to trial in military courts, the legal basis of such reasoning is questioned by activists.

Yet a larger point looms behind the story: the military is not meeting the expectations for greater democracy, openness, and freedom that were in part the driving forces of public frustration expressed so loudly in Tahrir square. SCAF is jailing bloggers, civil society activists, and pro-democracy demonstrators.

There are reasons for that.

In their Foreign Affairs article, Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor address the incentives that drive the military’s decision-making and the reasons behind its “ambivalence toward democracy.”

While the military has pledged to move towards democracy and remain under civilian control over the longer term, its main priority, the authors argue, is not to build a full-fledged democracy in the country.

Instead, the goal is to pass power to a civilian government in order to avoid being blamed for Egypt’s ongoing socio-economic struggles. Image matters in Egypt, especially for the military. Moreover, in transitioning to a civilian government, a strong belief in democracy is not the guiding principle; that guiding principle is protecting its own “power and perks.”

One way the military has tried to maintain control of the political scene going forward has been to build influence in local governorships. Indeed, the number of governors related to former military or security officers has increased in the past few months. Governors are appointed, not elected, and may become a tool for distributing favors and building alliances that can withstand the test of time.

Yet, while reading about arrests of democracy activists may be discouraging, there are indeed reasons to be optimistic. As Martini and Taylor note, despite their careful attempts to control political institutions, “the generals may find that democracy, once unleashed, is difficult to control.”

Egyptian civil society has tasted the freedom and endless possibilities of democratic and economic reform over the past few months. I doubt they’ll be willing to let it go.

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