Tag Archives: china

System shocks and property market institutions

Participants at the Beijing roundtable on property markets (Photo: Unirule)

I first traveled to China in 2001 not long after the real estate reforms of 1999 to help build professional real estate services there. China was committed to moving to more privatization of its real estate markets and there was a great desire to replicate – often uncritically – the success of U.S. property markets. It was quite a different world on my recent trip to China to attend an expert roundtable held earlier this month by the Unirule Institute of Economics at Renmin University in Beijing on the findings of the International Property Markets Scorecard.

The roundtable was a part of CIPE’s larger program in Armenia, China, Kenya, Philippines, and Russia meant to explore the barriers faced by small businesses in urban commercial property markets and ways to overcome them. The scorecard is a tool evaluating various elements of property markets, such as property rights or access to credit, showing interconnections between them, and highlighting priorities for reform. The roundtable participants engaged in a lively debate and were determined to make sure that local circumstances are accurately represented in the scorecard. “This came from the U.S. so it will need to be adjusted.” This was a new attitude, openly expressed.

Today real estate is the hot topic in China. Residential housing in urban areas was the first wave and privatization of residential markets has led to enormous speculation in apartment prices. Everyone now wants to get rich in real estate. The government recently issued a Purchase Limit Order – limiting each family to buying two apartments. The Chinese experiment with partial privatization has led to regulation problems just as the lack of regulation led to problems in the sub-prime crisis in the U.S.

Property is a mean for distributing power – and for creating economic opportunity. This requires appropriate regulation, primarily to monitor system drains. If systems are not aligned properly, power will be diverted to few and economic opportunity will be undermined for many. Ultimately such diversions can cause system failures. The U.S. housing market has yet to recover from the last system failure.

Credit markets across most assets types in the U.S. remain tight. The Chinese are now also pulling back in commercial markets where there is a trend toward renationalization. Property rights and access to credit are core elements of the property market system. A shock in one area spreads around the entire system, not only affecting residential mortgages but the availability of loans for small businesses.

China’s property market system is a dual system. Property rights are bifurcated into land use rights and buildings. The appropriate regulation in a dual system is even more complex. As China formalizes its property markets there are enormous costs. Over the last decade people have at least been compensated when their land and homes are taken for development, although the structure of incentives and fairness of compensation is often in question. At the roundtable one of the participants mentioned that he knew someone who was told by local officials that they could get more money if they demolished their home. The farmer set to tearing down his own house.

So U.S. citizens are walking away from their mortgages while Chinese farmers demolish their own homes – each hoping for a better life. Over the last decade, I have seen the U.S. and China meet in the middle of the economic cycle – the U.S. on the way down, China on the way up. At this unique moment we have to take responsibility and realize we are now in one integrated system. To avoid more shocks, and to create more economic opportunity based on sound market institutions, we all have to work together with more honesty and trust to see that power through property rights is more equally distributed for the citizens of the world.

Bill Endsley is a CIPE consultant and principal of the Chicago-based World Citizen Consulting with broad experience in developing international property markets as a means for broader economic development and global security.

Capitalism with entrepreneurial characteristics

(Photo: Reuters/Joe Tan/Files)

China is often held up as a model of state-directed, market-driven growth, symbolized in the slogan “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.” Yet, in a recent cover story by The Economist, the authors found that perhaps a more accurate model may be symbolized by a small warehouse in Zhejiang, a coastal province situated on the shores of the Taiwan Straits.

Inside the cold, dimly lit factory, workers assembled components for electrical tools that are sent to manufacturers across a “horizontal network of trade and capital.” Outside the factory sit the fruit of their labor: Jaguars, BMWs, and Porsches. China’s private sector accounts for some 70 percent of its GDP, 93 percent of all of its companies, and 92 percent of its workers. Yet, something in the warehouse wasn’t quite right.

For one thing, the factory’s owner wouldn’t let The Economist use his name, for fear of the consequences. Why? It’s because for all of this entrepreneur’s success he still operates squarely in what’s known as the “informal sector,” or the part of the economy that sits outside of formal regulations and taxation. No one quite knows the percentage of businesses in China that operate in this shadow economy, but as The Economist sees it, these entities are the true engine of China’s growth and point to the profound need for reform in China if broad-based development is to continue.

China’s booming economy, growing influence, and rapidly expanding military undoubtedly makes the country a formidable force in the world today. Significantly, this success seems to have come outside the Western narrative of rights and governance. As such, many see in China’s rise a new model for development in the 21st century, and one that’s particularly attractive to other developing countries.

What is China doing right? By almost any standard, China has developed at a terrific rate. On average, its GDP has grown by 11 percent each year for the past 30 years. Measured at purchasing power parity, this translates to an almost tenfold increase in GDP per head over the same period. China’s hard currency reserves are the largest in the world, mainly in dollars fed by an immense trade imbalance with America. Poverty fell by over 50 percent since 1981, and infant mortality by 40 percent since 1990. Telephone access in this same period rose more than 94-fold. Yet, it is not the rate of development alone that is impressive. Japan grew at similar rates up until the 1970s. So did South Korea until the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Neither country though came from the desperate level of poverty found in China when reforms began in 1978 or boasted the incredible size of China’s population and territory.

With all of this success, is there a Chinese model to follow? Certainly, China’s approach has been highly pragmatic and linked to its own unique interests and capabilities. Many have tried to define this approach in general, applicable terms, the most famous attempt being the so-called “Beijing Consensus.” As described by Joshua Ramos, the Beijing Consensus is “practical and ideological at the same time”, centering on a “ruthless willingness to innovate,” a strong sense of national defense and strategic interests, and a steady accumulation of the ability to project power asymmetrically. If there’s a model, it can be found in mixed ownership, state champions, heavy state intervention, and decentralization of innovation to local townships and villages.

What is more striking is not what constitutes the Chinese economy, but what doesn’t. Market economies normally display a large degree of private ownership, secure property rights, liberal financial markets, and relatively open political institutions. These attributes are not fully part of China’s economy as of yet.

There is a critical piece of history that I have passed over, though, and in its telling one finds an often overlooked aspect of China’s development. In 1978, China had just emerged from a devastating famine that killed nearly 45 million people, most immediately a result of a disastrous agricultural policy. The average Chinese was living on less than a dollar a day and could barely get by. In the popular telling of the story, this is when Deng Xiaoping called for the “reform and opening up” of China. The reforms began in the rural areas with townships and village enterprises spearheading a decentralization of control, the development of local markets, public-private ownership of property, and increased access to finance.

That opening up has now developed into what The Economist calls China’s “bamboo economy.” While it is true that many of China’s largest companies are state-owned, “alongside the mighty state engine myriad smaller ones are whirring – and probably more efficiently.” A recent study found that investing in completely private Chinese firms yielded a nearly 10 percent greater return on equity than investing in state-backed entities.

It would seem that running unencumbered by the red tape of bureaucracy would be a good thing. In abstract, entrepreneurs are freed from “direct state management” and the thicket of licenses, titles, and taxes that often stifle economic growth. Factories and firms can emerge quickly to meet a perceived demand, and local politicians steer clear of them because they need the high rates of growth that this entrepreneurism brings.

Yet, in this environment, entrepreneurs are also subject to the whims of bureaucrats and find it hard to access the capital needed to grow their businesses to maturity. There “is ample scope for abuse” by public officials, hence the fear by the factory owner in Zhejiang at being publicly referenced. Corruption is only a step away; officials demand a piece of the action and informal entrepreneurs are ready to supply it if only for the sake of staying in business. In fact, as The Economist’s correspondent went in to the factory, he saw one local official leaving a meeting that isn’t supposed to have happened with a firm that isn’t allowed to exist.

There is a rule of law deficit in China, one that no amount of fiscal surplus can paper over for long. The Economist is right to call attention to the growing challenge of informality in China, as well as the dynamic nature of private sector entrepreneurialism that lies at the heart of China’s growth.

Who is serving whom? How China exploits people’s savings

Who is serving whom in China's banking system?

While the world is increasingly dazzled by the Chinese government’s financial might, we often neglect the fact that the ammunition of its vast state-owned banks derive from the savings of its (emerging) middle class. Because China’s financial sector remains nascent and dominated by the state, the general public has little choice but to deposit their hard-earned money into state banks. This virtual monopoly allows the state to impose low interest rates that provide the government with low borrowing costs subsidized by the public. This lopsided arrangement is a significant source of public dissatisfaction, particularly when the government uses depositors’ money to bail out mismanaged state run banks.

Financial gymnastics by local governments

Under the current regulation, local governments are not allowed to issue bonds. As a work around, local governments establish investment companies that then borrow money from state-owned banks to support essentially off-book investment projects. At the national level, a similar process has taken hold: in the 80’s, the central government transferred responsibility for financing much of the state’s investments to state-owned and -controlled banks with the goal of improving the position of the central budget.  Victor Shih from Northwestern University extensively documents these developments in his book, “Factions and Finance in China.”

The risks associated with these off-the-books transactions—hidden on the balance sheets of banks rather than the public budget—have long been conveniently ignored by government officials, who are rather more concerned with short-term achievements and growth targets that will advance their careers. But a number of reformers and civil society advocates have begun to warn the government of the poor state of the investment companies, many of which do not appear to have the ability to repay their debts in the long-run. Reformers therefore call for a dramatic overhaul of China’s financial system to ensure long-term sustainability.

Local government investment companies have concentrated their loans on the property market and on infrastructure, particularly railroads, highways, and airports (the so called “iron rooster” trio). With most such investments, profitability and market demand take a backseat to the financing of public officials’ pet projects that help showcase their achievements and provide a stepping stone for promotion. In this way, depositors’ money is squandered at the will of powerful politicians.

Unsurprisingly, these projects have relatively low returns. As a result, the investment companies typically have low liquidity, and loans are repaid slowly. To get these long-term, unappealing loans off their balance sheets, banks repackage the loans into “trusts”—not  unlike the structured investment vehicles that produced the American Subprime Crisis—and sell them to investors. With relatively high returns and tacit endorsement of the local government, these trusts are highly popular with investors, who—unwisely—do not ask too many questions.

Professor Shih’s estimates of China’s hidden local government debt are staggering. Based on his research (“China’s 8,000 Credit Risks”), local investment companies’ total borrowing amounted to $1.6 trillion between 2004 and 2009—and Shih suspects that the problem is actually worse because he could not track lending from low-level governments. If accurate, this level of borrowing is equivalent to a massive one-third of China’s 2009 GDP and 70% of its foreign-exchange reserves.  Some in-depth reports from local sources in China point in the same direction. A Chinese financial newspaper with a circulation of over half a million, the 21 Century Business Herald, estimates that the local governments’ debt exceeds $1.2 trillion (8 trillion RMB). Even the Central Bank (PBOC) admits that local governments’ loans totaled more than $757 billion (5 trillion RMB) in May 2009.

The Financial Times expects only about 80 percent of this debt to be recoverable (resulting in losses easily exceeding $200 billion). Yet this number may well be optimistic. Local governments typically use land as collateral to obtain loans. Should the price of land collapse, many local governments will find themselves unable to pay their debts. This is almost certainly why the central government has had little success in containing property prices in its attempt to appease public outcry at the ever increasing cost of housing; self-interested local governments are no doubt complicit in propping up the value of land, their primary asset (for a more detailed discussion, see my featured service article).

The public is left with the bill

Should the property bubble pop and take down the banking system with it, it will be the general public who will have to foot the bill for state bailouts. Assiduously accumulating staggering amounts of foreign reserves, China would probably have the financial might to tackle the resulting non-performing loans. But China’s depositors will be saddled with a tremendous financial burden as a result of the state’s inefficient financial sector interventions and central-planned policy.

The state’s vast financial arm mesmerizes many around the world. Even Francis Fukuyama has lauded China’s efficiency in infrastructure construction. But we should not forget: these investments (often of questionable economic rationale) come at a great cost. For one, they are at the expense of the public’s future purchasing power as they are forced to accept low interest rates to subsidize the personal ambitions of local officials. For another, the state’s exploitation of the financial sector crowds-out private enterprise and market-driven investment projects.

Lacking an independent monitoring system and ignorant of market demands, many of the state’s investment projects will undoubtedly prove wasteful. Consequently, despite their many sacrifices, the depositors who will end up holding the tab are given no say in how their government decides to spend their hard earned savings.

Development without democracy?

Almas Kusherbayev is a Kazakh journalist working in Central Asia.

The debate on whether a market economy can exist without democracy is ongoing, and many think that at least two countries in the world are good examples of how the former can exist without the latter: China and Singapore. The question is whether such systems can be models for development without democracy in other countries. But a closer look at the nature of China’s and Singapore’s economic transformation highlights some important political and social factors as well that hardly make their models universal.

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The need for transparency in China

From Reuters: A labourer carries a window at an under-construction residential area in Wuhan, Hubei province November 29, 2008. (Reuters/Stringer/Files)

A series of articles have come out in recent months that might lead one to believe that something just isn’t quite right with the Chinese property market. Like the finding that there are apparently enough vacant properties in China to house 200 million people. That 65 percent of commercial properties in Beijing are empty. That buildings are blown up soon after being completed simply so they can be rebuilt. Perhaps it is the stories of ghost cities. That Chinese developers have taken to hiring young Westerners to pretend to be heads of (non-existent) Western firms that are supposedly commissioning building projects.

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Learning the Hard Way: China’s Distorted Real Estate Market

Soaring property prices have effectively priced the average Chinese citizen out of the housing market. Last year, a government official conceded that he could not afford an apartment on his humble salary. Fortunately for him, most government officials are provided with comfortable public housing—he need not worry. The emerging middle class does not have it so easy: for instance, statistics show that it is not at all unusual for an ordinary resident of Beijing to spend 80 percent of his income on monthly mortgage payments. This leaves little room for discretionary spending, thereby crippling the middle class’ purchasing power and standard of living while contributing to a widening wealth gap.

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Naked Government

The New York Times highlights a changing decades-old tradition in China for the government not to disclose information on its spending habits.  The original story on Asia Times Online talks about a small town in the Sichuan province, where public officials decided to disclose its budget.  The findings are quite interesting – 65% of government funds were spent on entertainment and accommodations…of local public officials.  But, as the story notes, the public is not outraged about the spending – most of the people seem to be happy with the fact that the government is actually releasing the numbers.

(Part of Publicized Baimiao Village Government Spending in January. Source: http://www.chinahush.com)

This translation of a Chinese commentary notes that in just 3 days the story got the attention of more than 300,000 people on the web.  It has some interesting opinions on what it all means and ends with a rather provocative question: whether this move by a village government is a call to other governments throughout the country to do the same?  Will others step up to the plate?