A-tax on the Press

Recently, the Tax Ministry in Turkey slapped a record $2.5 billion lira fine on the country’s largest media conglomerate, Dogan Media Group (DMG). While the government insists that the company is guilty of tax evasion, opponents of the Justice and Development party (AKP) claim that this is further evidence of Prime Minister Erdogan’s penchant for authoritarianism. Yes, the DMG has most likely violated tax laws, but the disproportionately high penalty (the fine is nearly as much as the value of the company) and the selective application of the law (other media conglomerates are also guilty of similar activities), suggests that the DMG may have been targeted because of long-standing tension between DMG’s owner, Aydin Dogan, and Erdogan. Indeed, the staunchly secular Dogan, has been an outspoken critic of the Prime Minister since his days as mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998) and his newspapers have often disparaged the government for taking Turkey in an Islamist direction. The dispute between the two came to a head last fall in the lead-up to provincial elections when Dogan newspapers reported on links between the AKP and a Turkish charity based in Germany, Deniz Feneri, that had been indicted for fraud. In response, an indignant Erdogan urged his supporters to boycott newspapers that he said “stand by others rather than stand by the prime minister of the Turkish Republic.”  

Turkey’s austere limits on freedom of expression have often been criticized by human rights group and Western governments. Turkey ranks last among Western European countries in Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press index and 102 out of 173 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ index. The infamous Article 301 of the Criminal Code, which makes insulting the vague concept of “Turkishness” a crime, has been used to prosecute hundreds of journalists who have been critical of the secular-nationalist orthodoxy. Although the law was amended in 2008 the change in terminology to “damage to the Turkish nation” remains equally nebulous. Furthermore, the year-long blockage of You Tube because of a frivolous video which insinuates that Ataturk was homosexual seems more in line with the harsh tactics of countries like Iran and China than those of a European Union candidate. So the suppression of dissent is nothing new in Turkey.  But such undemocratic behavior has generally been associated with the military establishment. What makes the Dogan fine so controversial is that it confirms suspicions that the seemingly reform-minded AKP is only interested in democratization when it serves its own interests. 

The AKP came to power in 2002 by bringing together a loose coalition of marginalized groups (Islamists, Kurds) and secular liberals who wanted to curtail the inordinate powers of the entrenched elite (i.e. the military). However, Prime Minister Erdogan’s growing intolerance for critical voices has served to isolate these secular liberals. This fine is not the first time the Prime Minister has created an environment of intimidation and censorship. Erdogan has the dubious distinction of filing the most lawsuits of any Turkish Prime Minister against journalists and cartoonists critical of the government. In November, the Prime Ministry refused to renew the press licenses of six journalists for allegedly printing “inaccurate information.” And in the current row, there are rumors that Erdogan has pressured Mr. Dogan to fire various hostile columnists in exchange for clemency. 

The current controversy underscores another serious problem : the dearth of objective press. Without credible news sources, the people have no one to trust and rather than holding the government accountable for its governance record they react to the government based on factional divisions. While there are a whole slew of newspapers purporting different viewpoints with relatively free reign in Turkey, much of the media is caught up in partisan recriminations, which only serves to harden the bias of any already polarized public. News is often distorted by Turkish media owners’ political preferences and perceived business interests. As the State Department’s Human Rights Report notes, “Most media companies are owned by large, private holding companies that have a wide range of outside business interests . . . the concentration of media ownership influences the content of reporting and limits the scope of debate.” The report gives as an example a journalist who says that senior management discouraged the company’s journalists from writing articles critical of the AKP to win business contracts. On the other side of the spectrum, in publishing reports about the Deniz Feneri charity, the DMG may have sought revenge for Erdogan’s refusal to change the zoning of the parkland around an Istanbul hotel owned by Dogan.

In addition to business interests, coverage is often filtered through a certain political lens, so that only stories that buttress the newspaper’s viewpoints are reported on. In the controversy over Deniz Feneri, the pro-AKP newspapers focused solely on Ergdogan’s accusations against DMG, leaving out entirely the allegations in the German indictment. In the current case, the Dogan group has used the rallying cry of democracy and freedom of press to bolster its claims against the AKP, but they are often loath to allow for these same freedoms when it comes to groups that don’t concern them. In contrast, the pro-government newspapers have ignored the news about the fine entirely. 

The controversy confirms that Turkey’s commitment to democracy remains tenuous and could prove to be a roadblock in accession talks with the European Union. The European Commission condemned the fine immediately. A recent article in The Economist notes that, “it is increasingly hard to pretend that Turkey’s negotiations with the EU are on track.” While the article goes on to blame European officials for duplicity, without ensuring freedom and objectivity of press Turkey is also to blame for not upholding the standards of democracy.

Published Date: September 22, 2009