Acting Locally, Regionally and Globally: Think Tanks and Transnational Policy Debates Beirut, Lebanon February 6-8, 1999

Sponsored by the Center for International Private Enterprise, the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

Introduction

Why are so many think tanks interacting at regional and global levels? Why do think tanks build networks with other think tanks and with other non-governmental actors? Do such alliances effectively promote the spread of ideas and analysis into government? Such questions about the broad socio-political interactions of think tanks and patterns of their global development can be contrasted with a range of more practical questions about their strategies, policy tactics and programmes. How can think tanks best facilitate cross-national transfers of policy ideas, practices and policy programs? What lessons can learned from elsewhere in the world concerning the effectiveness of networks? How do regional policy networks support policy advocacy on a national level? As will be shown in the following discussion, networking has not only facilitated the international spread of ideas, it has become an increasingly important mode of activity for think tanks, and a means by which they can sometimes effect considerable influence on domestic and regional policy making. This will be illustrated through a brief case-study of the role of Asian think tanks in economic and security co-operation networks. However, the paper will commence with an overview of think tank patterns of development world-wide, focusing on the trend towards transnationalisation.

The transnational boom in think tank development has been prompted by foundations, corporations and other non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) demanding high quality research, policy analysis and ideological argumentation on the one hand, but also by grants from governments and international organisations seeking to extend policy analytic capacities, aid civil society enhancement or promote human capital development. Think tanks can also deliver specific policy proposals, promote 'global best practice', or provide data, analysis and technical expertise to assist in policy implementation. As think tanks usually have social status as reputable scholarly bodies, many are drawn into global and regional intellectual networks as legitimate knowledge providers. Consequently, many think tanks have become important actors in the spread of policy ideas at both a transnational level and in a domestic context. This process has come to be known as lesson-drawing and/or policy transfer.

Lesson-drawing is regularly undertaken by think tanks. Cross-national comparison is part of their modus operandi (Stone, 2000). Investigating the policies and practices of other countries or regions is a non-controversial feature of think tank activity. It arises either from a pragmatic desire to spread effective policies or for ideological reasons. Furthermore, these are future-oriented, reform-minded and outward-looking organisations. Comparison and lesson-drawing is innate to their intellectual endeavours. However, think tanks cannot impose policies on a political system. They can only be engaged in the voluntaristic approach of lesson-drawing rather than the coercive aspects of transfer such as can be imposed by international organisations like the International Monetary Fund. Instead, the importance of think tanks to policy transfer is their ability to diffuse ideas by acting as a clearing-house for information; their advocacy of ideas; and their involvement in domestic and transnational policy networks. These functions are discussed in the last half of the paper.

The Global Spread and Transnationalisation of Think Tanks

Since the 1970s, there has been a massive proliferation of think tanks world-wide. It has been propelled by factors such as the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the demise of many authoritarian regimes, the increasing availability of foundation support and development aid for such organisations and the world-wide phenomenon of 'third sector' associational growth (Salamon, 1994). Additionally, greater numbers of policy entrepreneurs and intellectuals are willing to take advantage of changing conditions in local and global environments to establish think tanks (Stone, Denham & Garnett, 1998; McGann & Weaver, 2000). This world-wide growth of the think tank form has also been propelled by emulation. Organisational emulation or copying is a two-way process whereby domestic intellectual elites look to countries where think tanks are well-established to learn about various organisational models and modes of activity. For example, during the 1990s, there has been a conscious effort to draw upon the American tradition of think tanks and modify it to suit the Japanese cultural and institutional context (Telgarsky & Ueno, 1996). Intra-regionally, think tank entrepreneurs look to developments in neighbouring countries. Alternatively, official aid agencies or foundation officials promote European or American style institutes as an organisational template for think tank development elsewhere in the world. They complement the numerous think tanks that have emerged from domestically grounded initiatives. As a consequence, most nations have at least a small think tank population (see Day, 1993).

Think tanks have become an established part of the policy scenery in liberal democratic states. Their increased numbers, diversified structure and character, and intensified competition with one another for funding, media attention and government recognition has lead to an increasingly congested nature of think tank industry in some countries, most significantly in the USA. This phenomenon has been one force in the transnationalisation of think tanks. It is also symptomatic of the increasingly transnational character of many contemporary policy problems such as concerns the environment or financial markets. Since the late 1980s, a growing number of think tanks have extended their activities beyond their home states. The Trilateral Commission and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore are perhaps two of the oldest examples of an international and a regional think tank but other think tanks are transnationalising their activities (Stone, 1999). A number of American institutes have opened offices abroad; the Heritage Foundation in Hong Kong and the Urban Institute in Russia. The increasing pace of European Union activity has seen the emergence of regional institutes which do not adhere to any specific national identity: for example, the Centre for A New Europe and the European Policy Centre, both in Brussels, and the Research Institute for European Studies in Greece. The advantage of such arrangements is the improved capacity and quality of policy research, the ability to draw upon a greater pool of expertise, the cross-fertilisation of ideas, and amplification of policy work in more than one national arena.

International research collaboration and interaction has become extensive and is reflected in the web-sites and internet directories of think tanks. Formal international networks of think tanks are more common, organised around specific policy fields such as environment or development. The Institute for African Alternatives was established in London in 1986 with a network of branches in Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal, Zimbabwe. Similarly, the Instituut voor Europees Milieubeleid in the Netherlands is formally linked to environmental institutes in four other European nations. Furthermore, the emergence of industry-like associations and formal research collaboration reflects a more developed mode of elite interaction at global and regional level. 'Global ThinkNet' is an ad hoc elite gathering of the heads of the world's largest and most prestigious think tanks to discuss ways of influencing policies. These international networks between think tanks are indicative of the extent of think tank development globally and the growing pace of transnational activity.

To some extent, think tank prominence at a global or regional level is reflective of the extent of think tank consolidation within their home country. Think tanks do not become regional or global actors unless they find a firm fundament at a domestic level. A strong domestic capacity affects the ability of think tanks to act transnationally. Transnational activity requires finance, leadership skills and vision as well as expert personnel to carry forward the organisation into these new fora. Accordingly, the ability of think tanks to interact at global levels is also a function of size and command over material and ideational resources. Most institutes do not have the funds or personnel to devote to networking at a global or regional level. Institutes that operate in global arenas tend also to be elite, well-established and high profile bodies in their national context. The vast majority of think tanks are not known beyond their national borders and lack the size, stature, recognised experts and resources of these institutes. Accordingly, the transnationalisation of think tanks is creating new hierarchies between think tanks.

Western think tanks are more prominent than institutes from the 'South' or the developing world. Bodies like the Trilateral Commission, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Brookings Institution and ISEAS have prominence in global or regional affairs. They use their superior resources, whether it be funding, professional personnel or entrée to transnational policy networks to promote normative policy positions. Asian, Latin American or African institutes may acquire regional stature but few gain the global reputation of relative 'new comers' like the World Resources Institute (WRI), or the Institute for International Economics (IIE) both in Washington DC. Mature think tank communities in liberal democracies have created fertile conditions for the complex and overlapping networks of think tanks in Europe and North America. This development is unlikely to abate. Concurring with the view of 'population ecologists' that "more will follow where some exist" (Abzug & Turnheim, 1998: 318), think tanks are increasingly likely to be interacting at a transnational level in the next millennium.

In order to function beyond the national context, regional think tank networks are an effective first step to secure a foothold in the global sphere. Regional associations of think tanks also have a legitimacy in addressing regional and national policy issues that the large mainstream western think tanks do not possess. They have greater knowledge of local conditions and political regimes that makes them more appropriate vehicles for the circulation of ideas and people from one context to another.

Policy transfer and think tanks

Considerable scope for think tank involvement in global and regional policy developments lies in their capacity for lesson-drawing and policy transfer. These organisations have helped transport ideas and knowledge about policy and practice from one context to another. Policy transfer "refers to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place" (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). One way in which it occurs is when transnational policy communities share their expertise and information and form common patterns of understanding regarding policy (Bennett, 1991: 224-25; Rose, 1993).

Think tanks transfer ideas and ideologies, policy proposals and justifications, methodologies, personnel and expertise, as well as documents and fora for policy discussion and exchange. They help transfer the intellectual matter that underpins policies. They can provide the rhetoric, the language and scholarly discourse to give substance and legitimacy to certain preferred positions. Such arguments can then be used by other actors in governmental or party political debates involving policy transfer. Think tanks help fashion a shift in the climate of opinion or public attitudes through constant advocacy of certain positions and criticism of other stances. Sometimes, investigating the practices of another country also prompts new ways of thinking about a problem that leads to policy innovation.

Think tanks cannot bring about policy transfer alone but are dependent on government actors to see policy transfer through to fruition, instituted in government policies and programmes. The non-governmental status of think tanks is a major structural constraint to policy transfer. If governmental actors are not receptive to, or aware of, think tank recommendation in a policy area, there is little hope that they will be a participant in policy transfer. Similarly, the ideological disposition of ministers or the party in office will occlude certain policy perspectives, hence certain ideologically identifiable think tanks. Nevertheless, their cross-national research and policy analysis is used to advise policy-makers of practices elsewhere, the success or failure of such policy innovations, and their general applicability or relevance to other contexts. Decision-makers do not always have the time or resources to accumulate sufficient evidence to make valid comparisons for lesson-drawing. Where state actors are constrained, under-resourced, bound by policy dogma or otherwise unable to undertake adequate assessments of policy lessons, think tanks have the expert resources and knowledge for drawing 'valid' lessons from the experiences of other countries to counter or challenge entrenched policy orthodoxies. That is, they provide information, draw attention to policy experience in different domains and spread ideas and information through their networks, domestically into the political parties, bureaucracy, media and academe, and internationally with other NGOs and international organisations. Consequently, a coalition of local or transnational networks can be of great assistance in amplifying messages about global 'best practice'.

Think tanks are ideal vehicles for lesson-drawing through research and analysis, but are best described as 'facilitators' of transfer. Think tanks can best facilitate cross-national transfers of policy ideas, practices and programmes by strengthening their linkages into transnational policy networks (as discussed in the final two sections) and by consolidating their capacity to act: (1) as a clearinghouse of information; (2) as policy advocates and mobilisers of public opinion; (3) as agents of learning.

Think tanks as clearing-houses of information and expertise

In brief, think tanks are a pool of knowledge and expertise concerning the policies of other countries, localities or regions which can be drawn upon. Think tanks sometimes house substantial libraries and usually employ leading policy experts who can provide a consultancy service or even free advice about policy experiments elsewhere. There are a manner of other services and programmes by which think tanks can make this knowledge available. One device is to build a data-base and directory of experts who can be contacted by phone, fax. or email. Needless to say, web-sites are of growing importance for signalling a think tank's expertise. Another tactic to ease the process of policy transfer is to provide publications that provide a detailed investigation of the operation of a specific policy in another country, complemented with advice and guidelines on how to institute the reform at home. Such handbooks for policy reform or 'how-to' manuals could outline draft legislation or blue-prints for implementation. During the 1980s, the Adam Smith Institute in London produced a range of popular (and cheap) publications for the international market detailing various methods of privatisation. Similarly, in the USA, the Reason Foundation has specialises in privatisation issues. The Foundation produces a Privatization Yearbook on privatisation trends, a monthly newsletter, Privatization Watch. and offers a 'hot-line' open to anyone with questions about privatisation.

In terms of international agreements or new policy regimes, think tanks are often well-placed to signal to domestic constituencies of changes in the external environment and report on negotiations. For example, domestic signalling occurs when think tanks convey information concerning the ISO 14000 EMS standards. For example, the Thailand Environment Institute provides training programmes, lectures, advice and so forth for the Thai business sector regarding compliance. Alternatively, numerous European Union think tanks can be found diffusing ideas and information to national audiences about tax harmonisation, the implications of the EMU or the technical requirements for meeting various EU Directives. The point is that think tanks function as a valuable source of information and as a communications bridge between different constituencies.

Think tanks as advocates of policies

Advocacy involves a more proactive desire to transfer ideas (rather than behaving as a passive conduit of information) whereby think tank scholars/activists are driven by ideological, scholarly or professional principles to spread specific practices or policies. Advocates or policy entrepreneurs are essential to policy transfer. Think tanks draw on contacts with the media and opinion leaders as well as with their corporate and other funders. They do not communicate ideas solely through the relatively elite and closed fora of seminars, conferences and publications. Many think tanks also seek to mobilise public opinion.

Firstly, think tanks adopt short term tactics of raising an issue to public prominence through through newspaper commentary, or through television and radio to influence or inform the public on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes, an organisation might adopt lobbying-style tactics or stage 'consciousness raising' events that are more frequently associated with pressure groups. Secondly, think tanks engage in medium term modes of mobilisation through publications, on-going interaction with opinion-formers, and usual think tank practices of research and analysis of contemporary problems and social ills. They make direct contact with political parties and (when possible) government ministries so as to cultivate a relationship and build trust. That is, they pour resources into interaction with policy communities -- seeking appointment to official advisory boards, presenting evidence to government committees, etc. -- in order to gain visibility and become an accepted part of the policy making architecture of a state. Thirdly, and much more difficult to discern are their long-term efforts to shape the climate of opinion within and without government.

As noted above, a good example of think tank advocacy that has assisted policy transfer concerns privatisation. Free market policy institutes have been important in spreading the ideas contributing to the international spread of privatisation. The so-called New Right think tanks in Britain -- the Centre for Policy Studies, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute -- pioneered research into privatisation. They swapped ideas with North American institutes like the Heritage Foundation, the Fraser Institute and the Political Economy Research Center (PERC). Policy papers and privatisation blue-prints were distributed to think tanks in Latin America and Australasia. Under the vicissitudes of economic recession and 'government overload', many governments became receptive to privatisation ideas and willing to implement it as a means to raise revenue or increase market efficiency. From the 1990s, as many former communist nations sought transformation into market economies, they drew upon the policy experiences of other countries. In conjunction with consultancy companies, banks and law firms, think tanks were called upon to provide technical advice and assistance. However, the free market think tanks were often distinctive actors in their advocacy of the superiority of the market and criticisms of state intervention in economy and society. In short, their advocacy was based on an ideological agenda to roll back the state. To have long term substantive impact of policy programmes and practice, think tanks need to help facilitate a real change in the understanding and conceptualisation of problems by decision-makers. That is, they need to provide interpretative frameworks to institute learning within government.

Learning

Policy transfer is not simply copying or emulation. There is also the "value of learning about different concepts and approaches rather than specific policy designs" (Wolman 1992: 41). Policy transfer of specific ideas or programmes is often underpinned by a deeper and prior process of learning. Learning takes place "in complex arrangements of state and societal actors in various types of domestic and transnational policy networks and policy communities" (Bennett & Howlett 1992: 282; also Knoepfel & Kissling Näf, 1998).

Think tanks are a potential agent of learning within policy networks of politicians, bureaucrats, the media and other non-governmental actors. To varying degrees from organization to organization, think tanks aspire to effect social learning. They want to promote knowledge and understanding of new ideas, programmes and policies. A number of think tanks are concerned to promote wider value change within society and in particular, a change to the underlying ideas to public policy. In other words, they aspire to the cognitive adjustment of the core beliefs of key public and private decision-makers. For example, the neo-liberal think tanks advocating privatisation wanted to entrench economic knowledge about the market into policy thinking. By contrast, some communitarian and 'progressive' think tanks have been spreading ideas about the 'Third Way' around the world (Newsweek, Dec 28, 1998 -- Jan 4, 1999:44-47).

Think tanks can also act as a trigger for more shallow learning in government. They can be antennae for discerning developments elsewhere and sensitising government to new problems or emerging issues. There are potential advantages to the non-governmental character of think tanks to the policy transfer process. A bureaucratically driven process may be too selective, slow or constrained by political considerations. Think tanks, as relatively autonomous organizations, have more flexibility to research all options and publicise their findings of the various policy tools and approaches adopted elsewhere. They have, or claim to have, greater research freedom.

Social learning assumes that "learning processes are reflected in both the behavioural and cognitive worlds of the policy actors" (Knoepfel & Kissling-Näf, 1998: 345). Learning leads to the development of 'consensual knowledge' by specialists about the functioning of state and society but which is also accepted as valid by decision-making elites. When consensual knowledge is developed at a transnational level, the potential exists for the diffusion of ideas to promote policy transfer. However, while learning via regional or global networks helps promote an 'international policy culture', it is not automatically the case that learning will take place in international organizations or national governments. The politics of social and economic change in any country invariably shape the course of reform.

Policy Networks and Think Tank Networks

Advocacy, the mobilisation of opinion and policy transfer is considerably enhanced by the networking of institutes. Firstly, the interaction between various institutes at both a domestic and international level helps create alliances where information is transmitted, a conduit for funding is established and skills and expertise are shared. Think tanks keep in touch with counterparts in other nations or states which exhibit shared set of values and/or policy interests. Such contacts allow think tanks to become aware of innovative policies adopted elsewhere and the opportunity to provide analysis and commentary of the relevance of such policies to their own context. When transnational groups of actors share their expertise and information they form common patterns of understanding regarding policy that can help shape an international consensus. It requires regular interaction of experts and practitioners at the international level such as through conferences and government delegations and sustained communication. A consequence is the development of common views and policy perspectives among an identifiable elite of people who work or are experts in a given field.

Secondly, think tanks facilitate the process of transfer by acting as fora for interchange among decision makers from government and international organisation and with other civil society and non-state actors. In other words, they help build the network infrastructure of 'policy communities'. A policy community is taken to mean all actors or potential actors who share a common 'policy focus' and who, over time, succeed in shaping policy. Members of a policy community (individual politicians and bureaucrats, interest groups and their staff, and experts within government, universities or policy institutes) interact regularly, developing a shared understanding concerning which problems are important and possible solutions. This does not imply total consensus; instead divisions can be evident among some policy community actors. Furthermore, the degree of openness or exclusivity of communities can vary from one policy sector to another; indeed, from one political regime to another.

The policy community idea can also be utilised at a local as well as international level. Policy communities are frequently identified in national policy making. More recently, it has been deployed to explain regional network relations in policy sub-fields in the European Union as well as in the Asia-Pacific (Higgott, 1994). This concept has perhaps had less currency in explaining international networks. Instead, concepts such as epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1997) have had greater currency. Despite the plethora of terms, these policy network concepts are useful for conceptualising the manner in which think tanks interact with decision-makers in governments and international organisations. In conjunction with other like-minded actors in networks, think tank knowledge is broadcast and amplified. However, networks also require co-ordination. Within such networks, think tanks perform useful roles as information clearing-houses, initiating research, acting as a site for discussions or intersection for actors from disparate backgrounds in NGOs, the military, government, international organisations, law and universities; and developing network infrastructure -- starting newsletters, building data-bases, organising conferences and preparing submissions. In sum, think tanks can help networks function more efficiently and coherently.

What lessons can learned from elsewhere in the world concerning the effectiveness of networks? Southeast Asia provides one example of a very effective case of networking between think tanks to propel new policy ideas into decision making at both a domestic and a regional level. The number of think tanks in Southeast Asian countries is relatively small but growing. Generally, the older mainstream policy institutes provide scholarly legitimation for government policy rather than aid the "free trade in ideas", and tend to be closely linked with their governments. Think tanks are state centred rather than societally centred and lack the independence associated with Western bodies. Consequently, they are elite organisations, often with close political connections. A select group of think tanks had significant policy impact from the late 1970s promoting the idea of east Asian economic co-operation through a broad regional policy community, and from the late 1980s spreading the idea of security co-operation through a tighter think tank network.

Economic Co-operation

Ideas about Pacific economic co-operation have not found their way onto the regional policy agenda by serendipity. The evolution of the Pacific economic idea has been a long process (Woods, 1993). Its introduction onto the policy agenda of the states of the Asia Pacific region, and between the state decision making communities of the region, has been via the evolution of a broad based regional 'policy network'. This policy network has been important in the evolution of an Asia Pacific economic dialogue. It exhibits shared normative and principled beliefs found in an adherence to the unquestioned virtue of economic co-operation. Three bodies in particular stand out for their efforts in promoting the idea of economic co-operation and the concept of an Asian region or pacific community. They are Pacific Free Trade and Development (PAFTAD), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference, later Council (PECC).

PAFTAD, PECC, PBEC and other processes of regional interaction such as the recently formed Pacific Basin Forum (PBF) provide the locus for the reinforcement of shared norms about the virtue of economic co-operation. Each have varying histories of the degree of governmental and non-governmental participation and organisation in them. One of the key aims of PAFTAD has been to combine scholarly research and technical expertise with policy oriented research relevant to co-operative inter-state relations in the region. PAFTAD has long been '...the intellectual driving force of the co-operation movement...[claiming]...to understand the political realities confronting economic policy makers’ (Woods, 1991: 313). PAFTAD has been more academic in style than PBEC which is more closely associated with business and lacks a separate policy analysis capacity but draws in the expertise of think tanks, academics and others. PECC is predominantly a tripartite body and is seen in the region as the logical extension from PAFTAD and, to a lesser extent, PBEC.

These regional non-governmental organisations are not think tanks. However, the involvement of key think tanks in their establishment and on-going activities has been central to their influence in spreading ideas and educating interests (Higgott, 1994). These non-governmental organisations were driven by co-operation among a group of academics (mainly economists), think tanks, business people and, importantly for the penetration of ideas into policy, representation of government officials. They were venues for early technical discussions about the prospects for regional co-operation and engaged in what was described earlier as social learning.

The early influence of PAFTAD, PBEC and especially PECC over the regional economic agenda setting process was central to the evolution of the co-operative dialogue, and the emergence of Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) in 1989. In its earliest guise, APEC needs to be seen as an exercise in regional dialogue, confidence building, information sharing, transparency and 'voice' for the region in the wider global trade debates. APEC is not a major exercise in institution building and has suffered set-backs since the 1997 economic crisis. The influence of non-governmental actors (including think tanks) diminished as APEC consolidated and became more politicised. Think tanks have been relegated to providing more technical advice and addressing issues of implementation. Non-governmental (corporate and academic) members of a policy community may be an important source of early ideas but the desire of governmental members of the community to resist intrusions into their domain by non-governmental members should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the non-governmental actors were essential for spreading ideas across nations, for building acceptance in new constituencies.

Security Co-operation

The Cold War in Asia was conducted through a set of bilateral relationships with a resulting absence of European style alliances. Although the Cold War removed ideological and superpower conflict, latent conflicts in the region came into focus. In the post Cold War environment there were few building blocks with which regional governments could discuss security concerns multilaterally. This vacuum saw the proliferation of non-governmental institutions engaged in security dialogue during the 1980s and 1990s. They have brought enhanced discussion of security issues, and the analysis of new security concepts such as that of 'common security'. The changed regional context forced a new awareness among policy elites and a willingness to experiment with co-operative approaches in economic, political and security affairs. Of particular relevance here, think tanks played an important role in shaping agendas and building networks of co-operation at an informal but nevertheless, elite level close to decision making circles. They engaged in 'informal diplomacy' or what is also described as 'track-two diplomacy'.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nation's, Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) was an important research and policy network composed of think tanks that established political support for new ideas about security in the region and central in the initiation of a new multilateral forum for security dialogue (Evans, 1994; Maull, 1994). Its objectives are: (i) to strengthen and increase regional co-operation in the development of research on strategic and international problems and issues in ASEAN countries; (ii) to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of strategic and international research by intensified communication between and co-ordination among members of the Association; and (iii) to contribute to ASEAN co-operation by promoting public knowledge and understanding of problems and issues faced by the ASEAN communities. The Association built a set of processes to discuss security issues on a multilateral basis and as such, the "ASEAN-ISIS initiative was somewhat ahead of the official position" (Kerr, 1994: 403).

The ASEAN-ISIS played a central role in the evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by successfully building a set of processes to discuss security issues on a multilateral basis. The ARF is the first region-wide forum for governmental discussion of security issues. Not until the ASEAN-ISIS institutes began proposing institutional arrangements for common security did the ARF Dialogue idea acquire greater support in Asia and beyond. The regional think tanks were an important venue to discuss and learn about security co-operation, to investigate practices in place elsewhere and modify Western concepts to regional conditions.

The Council for Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has since been created to help co-ordinate track-two activities in the region. This involves both improved communication among like minded states, an attempt to give coherence to multiplying security dialogue networks and NGO activity as well as more ambitious objectives of instituting "co-operative security approaches" that transcend ideological divisions and existing alliance structures. It provides a more structured process for regional confidence building acting as a mechanism for linkage and mutual support between the second track and official regional co-operation processes (Khong, 1995).

These dialogue venues are characterised by informality, personal relationships, consensus-building and have been important in generating trust, respect and a common identity among participants through a 'habit of dialogue'. In short, 'talking-shops' such as CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS have facilitated social learning. Think tanks helped socialise the norm of security co-operation. However, as ideas of security co-operation have coalesced into a new regional institution -- the ARF -- the agenda-setting impact of think tank sponsored informal dialogues is diminished. Again, a policy community in which political and economic interests are more pronounced, rather than the looser network arrangements of think tanks, develops whereby official processes consolidate in the new institutions.

Summary

For several decades a number of Asian think tanks have had research programmes concerning economic and security co-operation. Notwithstanding on-going scholarly debates and intellectual divisions, the body of policy related research conducted by a number of think tanks from the ASEAN states and elsewhere, combined with their policy entrepreneurship, contributed to wider political understanding about the possible benefits of co-operation. Their ideas found acceptance at an elite governmental level.

The case of economic co-operation suggests the impact of the Southeast Asian institutes may be time contingent. There may be historically specific periods during which lesson-drawing, learning and policy transfer is more apparent and more easily enacted. The ASEAN institutes provided a stable network structure in a general context of economic prosperity and governmental willingness to explore new ideas. Since the economic crisis hit Asia in July 1997, generating consensus through networks and dissemination of ideas has become much more difficult. Domestic concerns of economic adjustment have taken priority. Nevertheless, through regional associations such as ASEAN-ISIS, think tanks have been vehicles for learning and have built confidence in the idea of new institutions, or at the very least, the potential for co-operation. In other words, they have helped "socialise" the idea of regional co-operation (Kerr, 1994: 400). Governments in Tokyo, Washington DC. and Beijing were either cool, hostile or cautious about the non-governmental think tank initiatives on security and CSCAP until the work of ASEAN and other intellectuals constantly reiterating the case for dialogue during the early 1990s was too impressive to ignore and their venues for 'second track diplomacy' too important to dismiss.

'Informal diplomacy' is an important factor in explaining the increasing visibility of think tanks in global fora. This kind of diplomacy entails activities or discussions involving academics and intellectuals, journalists, business elites and others as well as government officials and political leaders 'acting in their private capacity'. Think tanks represent neutral ground and can provide a private venue for closed meetings, but at the same time, informal diplomacy allows think tanks to facilitate the flow of policy information. When operating at a domestic level, think tanks facilitate the downward flow from national decision-makers and foreign policy elites to local levels of decision-making, as well as to the 'educated public'. When operating at global or regional levels, think tanks facilitate the horizontal flow of information between transnational policy elites as well as to other non-state actors. It encourages the development of common or shared understandings of policy problems and consensus-building. For example, the EuroMeSCo network of policy institutes parallels the EuroMediteranean Partnership process, complementing the Euro-Med ministerial meetings with intellectual interaction and "unconstrained brain storming" to nurture "mutual understanding and respect" beyond the official level amongst the wider community (EuroMeSCo News, September 1997). The benefits of such 'track-two' dialogues are often intangible but occasionally, as in Southeast Asia, the outcomes of informal diplomacy are substantive.

Network Formats and Strategies

Networks enable think tanks to operate beyond their domestic context and networks are the means by which think tanks individually and in coalition can project their ideas into policy thinking across states and within global or regional fora. However, think tanks are involved in different kinds of networks. These can range from non-political cross-national research collaboration with academics, foundations and scientific associations. Networks can also be informal partnerships with various community groups, schools, professional associations and so forth to provide educational resources or training. Policy networks also differ in composition, tactics and style. Accordingly, think tanks can be incorporated into official policy communities (such as represented by informal diplomacy), participate in broad transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1997) that accommodate a range of NGOs, pressure groups and activists; or they can be incorporated in the more elite and scientific epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). As noted, think tanks also generate their own networks of research institutes. In short, think tanks are immersed in multi-layered networks characterised by dense exchanges of information, personnel and funding.

The question here, however, is what can regional policy networks provide to aid policy advocacy on a national level? The answer is qualified by the type of network in place, and the nature of think tank involvement in it. Additionally, the benefits of networking need to be counter-balanced against the tendency for networking to overtake other activities of think tanks. Networking can become an end in itself. However, there are diminishing returns from networking. Travelling to international conferences, maintaining links with colleagues in other think tanks, organising regional seminars, and so forth are activities that are no substitute for the real input into policy deliberations that comes from solid research and analysis. Networking helps to amplify such work and provide opportunities to diffuse ideas, but those ideas need first to be cultivated amongst staff and generated from the intellectual endeavours of local staff.

A regional network helps to generate regional or international consensus for specific policy ideas, or at the very least gives currency to alternative policy ideas. As in the East Asian example, ideas that may initially appear radical can (in the right circumstances) gradually find acceptance through constant research, advocacy and regular meetings to generate an elite consensus. An important but underestimated function of a regional network is to provide moral and intellectual support for a think tank (or other groups of intellectuals) that may be isolated in its domestic context. Such networks also provide a real but intangible benefit of creating fora for people with common policy interests to interact, exchange ideas and forge a consensus on policy problems.

At a more practical level, organisations within a regional network are useful to the domestic institute as they can feed information, provide advice, and assist in organisational consolidation. A regional network is a useful device for the circulation of ideas through visiting speakers. A noted foreign speaker can give powerful impetus behind new ideas. In some instances, regional associations channel personnel and resources to an institute, especially new institutes. This may translate into seed funding for new institutes or organising joint conferences; activities that help bolster policy advocacy of the national institute.

Networks are also important structures for providing external environmental impetus for the creation of institutes that do not, as yet, exist. The presence of a number of think tanks in surrounding nations, particularly if these organisations are interacting regionally, functions as a powerful force pulling for the creation of comparable organisations in political systems where none have been established. That is, a 'demonstration effect' can prompt intellectual entrepreneurs to respond to the opportunities afforded by regional (and international) networks by founding a new institute.

Much can be learnt from federal systems in building regional networks. In particular, the United States has a number of think tank networks. The State Policy Network in the USA which coalesced in 1991 is a network of like-minded free market and libertarian institutes attempting to co-ordinate their activities to develop acceptance for market-oriented policies from state to state. It started as an ambitious programme to facilitate joint research projects as well as raise funds, provide technical support and develop computer-facilitated communication. There is considerable co-operation. On a number of issues, analysis conducted in one state can be translated to other states. For example, a study sponsored by the James Madison Institute on a Florida state personal income tax also appeared -- with the necessary modifications -- as a Yankee Institute publication and as a Texas Public Policy Institute report. By establishing a general principle or policy approach in one state the StateNet institutes hope to promote "spillover" to other states. The Director of the Independence Institute, a think tank in Colarado, when proffering advice on starting a new think tank, extolled the virtues of 'copying what has succeeded elsewhere' such as recycling the papers of other institutes with a locally relevant cover or preface (Andrews, 1989). It is a quick and effective means to generate publications and attract governmental or media attention.

Whilst state level politics in the USA is qualitatively different from regional politics of MENA, the think tank networks that have been established provide useful blue-prints of how to structure networks while there are also useful lessons as to why they occasionally fail. Networks can be stretched too far, both in an organisational and a spatial sense. The success of ASEAN-ISIS was in part due to the strong regional identity within ASEAN, the relatively small number of institutes involved in the network, the elite character of all of them, and the close personal ties and friendships that developed between participants. As ASEAN grows, the inclusion of more think tanks dilutes the network and consensus formation becomes more difficult. This is particularly the case as the new member institutes are often from countries such as Cambodia facing very different economic, social and security dilemmas than those of the more economically advanced ASEAN states; notwithstanding the fact that ASEAN-ISIS already engages in 'gate-keeping'.

Memberships is not open and ASEAN-ISIS deliberations are not transparent. Whilst this form of closure may be necessary to accommodate the governmental participants in the dialogues, this kind of network constitution raises questions of democratic participation and accountability. Networks can promote greater pluralism or representation of diverse views, but networks can also function as exclusionary devices that limit alliances and curtail exchanges to a select elite. The 'trade-off' between the requirement for network coherence, stability, co-ordination and consensus with that of inclusiveness, transparency and wider civil society participation is a difficult one.

Membership or formal affiliation with a regional network can have symbolic value, signalling that an institute is of high standing. A more intangible role of a regional network is the way in which they can operate to lift standards and promote professionalisation. In short, a network can establish a regional standard of excellence in policy analysis. Membership and/or participation in a regional network can also confer status on domestic institutes which can then declare their wider relevance and international recognition to national audiences. It becomes a self reinforcing dynamic. Political themes are reinforced by the multiplication of organisations. The scholarly or intellectual credibility of an institute is a key plank to its long term viability and reputation with governmental audiences. In an age of globalisation and regionalisation, incorporation into, or identification with, external actors is increasingly essential to organisational survival.

The creation of a research network was a means for one Japanese think tank to heighten its visibility and international reputation. In 1987, the Nomura Research Institute (NRI) sponsored the "Tokyo Club" -- a joint research and seminar programme on global issues involving three European institutes -- the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (IFO) and Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) -- and the Brookings Institution in the USA. Nomura benefited considerably from the relations it built with the four Western think tanks. NRI acquired insight into the operations, styles and management of some of the world's leading think tanks. Additionally, association with these organisations conferred respectability at home in Japan. The Tokyo Club has since been dismantled in part because of cost but also because it had served its purpose for NRI. Nomura learnt considerably from this exercise which allowed it to build credibility for another network. NRI also sponsors the Asia Club -- a network of Asian think tanks from nine countries. In other words, networks need not be permanent structures, but can be built and collapsed as and when necessary.

One way to enhance both credibility and survival is to develop or build advisory boards that link the local to the regional and international. That is, "in the search for resources necessary for organisational survival, organizations manage their environments in part by naming important external players to positions with the organization" (Seidal, 1998: 423). Co-optation of eminent individuals to the Governing Councils or Advisory Boards of an institute is a strategy that allows for a more fluid exchange of resources and accessing of information. Such a strategy also contributes to developing inter-organisational commitment and establishes legitimacy. The appointment of an individual to an Advisory Board is an important decision, signalling to others the direction that the organisation wishes to take or the status to which it aspires. A board of recognisable names is essential. Composed of individuals from the local or national community -- whether it be business-people, politicians or leading academics -- indicates a domestic orientation. Appointing individuals from outside a country sends different signals and can favourably position an institute in its broader environment.

An advisory board of a non-profit organisation undertakes activities such as reviewing applications for funding, making recommendations on new research programmes engage in fund-raising. Sometimes, these boards conduct evaluation and oversight, and become instruments of accountability. In terms of accountability, the willingness of distinguished thinkers, senior officials or other 'heavy hitters' to be listed as advisers on an institute's publications bestows legitimacy on the organisation. It is symbolic of an organisation meeting some international standard of intellectual and research capability. The formally prescribed independence of most advisory boards helps build credibility. This is a valuable commodity in an era of information over-load and the proliferation of what is often regarded as 'biased' or unreliable information and policy analysis emanating from some NGOs.

Additionally, members of advisory groups might act as representative at high profile official events, speak out in public fora to communicate research findings or open doors and facilitate staff access to public policy makers. With regional or international representation, however, the linkages are extended much further. On the one hand, international composition means drawing a wider range of expertise into an organisation. This may be familiarity with other political systems, corporate affiliations of significance, or a distance or detachment from both daily involvement in the think tank and from the domestic socio-political context to render objective judgements and feedback to the institute. On the other hand, the board can link an institute to key constituencies outside their national context to other think tanks but also to foundations, professional associations, corporations and international organisations. In other words, such individuals can act as ambassadors and advocates, bringing a higher level of visibility in a regional or international context as well as widening funding opportunities. Importantly, a regionally embedded advisory board is an effective device to link a think tank into a wider community without over-committing in-house think tank staff and resources to network activities.

In general, think tank involvement in networks is beneficial. Think tank networks bring revenue, human capital, legitimacy and scholarly credibility, visibility, information and a wider pool of expertise. Transnational advocacy networks embed think tanks in relations with NGOs, grass-roots organisations, foundations and activists. These kinds of networks are relevant for those aid agencies and other organisations seeking to promote civil society interactions from the local through to the global. Epistemic communities provide access to the latest (social) scientific thinking and policy-related research communities. Policy communities present the possibility of decision-making influence and incorporation into policy making. However, in the last instance, think tanks stand on their own. A think tank cannot trade on network activity alone. Furthermore, networks face the usual dilemmas of organisation and co-ordination. Developing a solid organisational basis with regular scheduled meetings, office space and representatives requires resources from organisations that are often already financially stretched. As such, networks are more vulnerable to adverse changes in funding or political environments and can be more likely to be dismantled than the organisations that compose it.

Conclusion

An increasingly noticeable trend in the think tank world is transnationalisation. Following current patterns of transnational activity it is apparent that those think tanks operating at a regional or global level tend to come from strong domestically-based think tank communities. The international think tank scene may be dominated by European and North American institutes but there are numerous opportunities for think tanks to operate at a regional level and build coalitions with counterparts from neighbouring countries. A significant degree of regional think tank activity can also represent a strong structural force pulling forth new think tank development. Participation in networks raises the regional and international profile of an institute.

Think tanks best facilitate cross-national transfers of policy ideas, practices and policy programs through their advocacy and their networks. However, in policy transfer dynamics there are limits to what think tanks can achieve. Their prime importance is in the construction of legitimacy for certain policies and in agenda-setting. They transfer the ideas and ideologies, the rationalisations and legitimations for adopting a particular course of action and it is part of their endeavours to draw attention to developments overseas. However, to see policy transfer occur these organizations are dependent on formal political actors. The detail concerning the wording of new legislation or the creation of new policy delivery agencies is in the hands of government officials. This makes networking within policy communities essential to think tank success. Such networks increasingly represent a new and informal mode of governance (as the Asian example of informal diplomacy revealed). Ideas can also be transferred through transnational advocacy networks to other non-governmental organisations such as grass-roots and voluntary organisations or foundations. While a longer-term route to policy change, it helps mould and mobilise public opinion.

Advocacy of ideas is part of the means of policy transfer but a certain balance is required in the style of advocacy. Above all, policy research institutes need to maintain their intellectual integrity, their reputation for reliable policy analysis, and their social status as expert knowledge providers. This legitimacy can be reinforced by developing internal and external linkages in the policy environment. Regionally embedding an institute can be achieved by strengthening think tanks networks through tactics such as the appointment of an international advisory board, arranging joint conferences or regular meetings, collaborative research and cultivating personal ties and contacts.

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